CABINDA'S YEAR OF WAR: 2002
The government of Angola considers… that it is indispensable to extend
the climate of peace achieved in the whole territory and hence to keep its firm
commitment of finding a peaceful solution to the issue of Cabinda, within the
Constitutional legality in force, taking into account the interests of the country
and the local population.1
Cabinda is the Cabindan’s hell.2
War in Angola may only now be over, 15 months after the government and UNITA
(National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) formally ended the civil
war that has pitted them against one another for the last three decades. Largely
ignored in the hype that surrounded the end of war between the government and
UNITA, the forgotten war (to borrow the title of a well-known volume on Angola
3)
in the Angolan province of Cabinda saw some of its worst fighting during the
country’s “year of peace”. But is the war in Cabinda now over?
According to Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) Deputy Chief of Staff General Nunda
Sachipengo, “the worst in the military phase has already passed” and
the FAA are now only involved in routine activities in Angola’s Cabinda
province.
4 These comments were made four months ago, in April 2003.
The main objective of the FAA, namely, to permanently defeat Cabinda’s
insurgents, has been largely achieved through a systematic counter-insurgency
campaign that swept through Cabinda from the middle of 2002. According to Cabindan
separatists, the war had “intensified since July when the government army
stepped up its operations there, drawing on its considerable forces which have
been freed from fighting UNITA.” In October 2002, it was reported that
the FAA had deployed helicopters and tanks to begin a final “assault”
on the separatists in Cabinda.
5 In addition, in this “final”
counter-insurgency campaign, the Angolan government allegedly used newly-incorporated
UNITA soldiers to “all but vanquish the splintered separatist factions
of the FLEC.”
6
When the Angolan government and UNITA signed the Memorandum of Understanding
on 4 April 2002, the situation in Cabinda had been relatively quiet for several
months. Soon after, however, reports of clashes in the Buco-Zau military region
between government forces and the separatists began pouring out of Cabinda.
The FAA gradually advanced to the heart of the rebel-held territory, and by
the end of October 2002 it had destroyed Kungo-Shonzo, the FLEC-FAC’s (Front
for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda-Armed Forces of Cabinda) main base
in the municipality of Buco-Zau. Situated 110km from Cabinda city, Kungo-Shonzo
had been in existence since 1979.
7 In April 2003, General Nunda Sachipengo
announced that the FAA’s command post in the Buco-Zau region had been closed
down.
8 And on 8 June 2003, the Angola Press Agency reported that
Francisco Luemba, Chief of Army Staff of the FLEC-FAC, together with six other
high-ranking officers, had surrendered to government authorities.
9
The war in Cabinda was now over—at least according to official Angolan
sources.
Earlier, at the end of December 2002, the FAA had claimed it had captured the
bastions of another separatist faction, the FLEC-R (Front for the Liberation
of the Enclave/State of Cabinda- Renewed) and seized considerable quantities
of arms and ammunition.
10 By the end of February 2003, General Armando
da Cruz Neto, Chief of Staff of the FAA, felt confident enough to observe that:
We are in a position to state that there have been significant
changes in Cabinda’s military situation as a result of operations carried
out by our armed forces. FLEC [Renewed] has ceased to operate since late 2002.
We could say that the operation launched to restore peace in Cabinda has reached
a positive phase. The next phase entails the development of border control
mechanisms so as to prevent FLEC forces from regrouping and returning.11
Militarily, the FLEC-FAC, under the Presidency of N’Zita Henriques Tiago
and the military command of Estanislau Bomba, presented the strongest resistance
to the FAA’s recent advance. Based predominantly in the northern centre
of the province, it has operated mostly in Buco-Zau, Belize and Micongue. On
the other hand, the other main separatist faction, the FLEC-R, although weaker
militarily and having engaged in virtually no military activity for some months
now, has evidenced a stronger political organization. Whatever their strengths,
however, Cabinda’s armed secessionist movements, with an estimated combined
number of troops of no more than 2,000, were powerless in the face of the FAA’s
large-scale offensive.
12
THE HUMAN COSTS OF WAR
The way in which the counter-insurgency operation in Cabinda was pursued
was inspired by the successful tactics of the 1988–2002 war against UNITA,
and the consequences for Cabinda’s civilian population have been almost
identical to those suffered by the general civilian population. As discussed
below, Cabinda’s “year of war” resulted in the displacement and
indiscriminate abuse of thousands of civilians, in summary executions, rape
and torture, in the destruction of property and in the pillage of villages.
Nevertheless, as was the case in “mainland” Angola, these blatant
violations of human rights were not committed exclusively by government forces.
Cabinda’s armed separatists were equally responsible for grave human rights
abuses, in a conflict that, although militarily characterized as low intensity,
has had a tremendous impact on the lives and livelihoods of Cabinda’s population.
It is difficult to evaluate the humanitarian situation in a province that is
essentially off-limits to all but those who work in the oil industry. As recently
as January 2003, the FAA prohibited a United Nations humanitarian assessment
mission from leaving Cabinda town, even though the mission had been suggested
by Sergio Vieira de Mello, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.
13
Nevertheless, non-governmental organizations, both foreign and Angolan, have
been able to report on the situation. Thus Amnesty International describes the
situation as follows in its 2003 report:
There were numerous allegations of human rights abuses but it was
difficult to obtain independent corroboration. FLEC sources reported indiscriminate
bombardments and land attacks on villages and makeshift camps in the forest
to which hundreds of civilians fled. They said that during these attacks scores
of unarmed civilians including women and children were killed and homes were
looted and burned. They also reported that soldiers raped women and girls,
sometimes in front of family members. …FLEC factions were also reported
to have attacked unarmed civilians and carried out other human rights abuses.14
Some of the humanitarian consequences of Cabinda’s “year of war”
have been more fully detailed in a recent report entitled “Terror in Cabinda”,
15
which was released on 10 December 2002. This report was produced by the Ad-Hoc
Commission for Human Rights in Cabinda, under the co-ordination of human rights
activist and journalist Rafael Marques and with the assistance of two Roman
Catholic priests, Paulo Taty and Jorge Congo. This first comprehensive report
on the human rights situation in the province (going back to March 1997) gives
a detailed account of cases of murder, summary executions, arbitrary detentions,
torture, disappearances, sexual assault and rape, as well as cases of pillage,
perpetrated by all the parties involved. The cases, which are individually described
and documented, are said to be no more than a sample of the total number of
cases of human rights’ abuses by both government forces and the separatist
movements.
While characterized as low intensity, the extent of the war in Cabinda and its
disproportionate impact on civilians give it extremely harsh contours. The authors
of the report remind us of this when they point out that the war was fought
throughout the province largely because the insurgency was seen as having the
implicit blessing of the majority of Cabindans. Because “Cabinda’s
population affirms itself, in its majority, as sympathisers of the self-determination
cause”, the impact of the war on civilians was severe, with allegations
of government forces reacting to attacks by separatist guerrillas by retaliating
against civilians.
16
The counter-insurgency effort undoubtedly had an inordinate impact on the everyday
lives and livelihoods of Cabindans. For example, when the FAA seized the FLEC-FAC’s
jungle base of Kungo-Shonzo in October 2002, the localities of Nekuto, Buco-Zau,
Belize and Miconje were heavily bombarded.
17 In addition, according
to the “Terror in Cabinda” report, “in the interior of Cabinda,
peasants are not authorised to farm without the presence of a soldier, to prevent
them from contacting the FLEC.” A similar situation pertains in terms of
the population’s access to the river Luali, situated between the municipalities
of Buco-Zau and Belize. Military forces control access to the water for all
purposes, allowing access only between 7am and midday and 2pm and 6pm in the
afternoon. Equally worrying, however, are the report’s allegations that
other villages, such as Caio Kaliado, Sintu Butiianga, S. Pedro
Kota (Povo Grande), Chimuanda, Makongolo e Chioba… are being the target
of strange repopulation movements with families coming from the south of Angola.18
The FAA has vehemently denied these accusations. On 12 April 2003, in an interview
on Radio Ecclesia, Deputy Chief of Staff General Nunda downplayed the separatists’
claims of FAA attacks on civilians.
19 However, the extent of the
humanitarian crisis is such that the MPLA’s Provincial Committee in Cabinda
felt it necessary for the Provincial government to “launch an urgent SOS
to national and international humanitarian organisations.” Although the
MPLA’s communiqué congratulates the FAA on its successful operations
in the province and maintains that Cabinda’s humanitarian crisis is above
all a result of “the massive return of citizens who abandoned the independentist
[sic] factions of the FLEC”, the fact of the matter is that the MPLA’s
declarations add to the mounting evidence on Cabinda’s troubled year.
20
The war in Cabinda, for so long out of the public eye, has inevitably gained
prominence and international attention. Beginning in the late 1990s, the recrudescence
of guerrilla activity coupled with the taking of hostages (mostly foreign workers)
gave the Cabinda question, both politically and militarily, its most significant
visibility since the 1970s.
21 The “Terror in Cabinda” report
brought the current situation to a wider audience, while the participation of
a Cabindan delegation at the 59th session of the Human Rights Commission of
the United Nations, which ended on 3 March 2003, is evidence of increased concern
over developments in this troubled Angolan province. However, as is discussed
below, the cumulative effect of conflict escalation and increased international
attention on developments in the enclave has not, as yet, contributed in any
significant manner to a serious debate on the future status of Cabinda, either
from the government or from the separatists.
AN OVERVIEW OF CABINDA
The town of Cabinda has a sleepy, forgotten air about it. It feels lush and
green with wide, tree-shaded streets and a striking absence of rubbish—a
stark contrast with Luanda. …From the beach and high points in town, the
platforms and oil flares stretched out on the horizon are visible, pumping oil
day and night. Otherwise, there is very little presence of the oil companies’
foreign employees in town. They all live in Malongo, a gated compound some 15km
down the road. Malongo bears the legacy of Cabinda’s long history of war;
it is still surrounded by landmines. The employees go by helicopter from the
airport to their compound and bypass the town completely.
22
With an area of approximately 2 800 sq miles, the Angolan province of Cabinda
is unique in being separated from the rest of the country by a strip, some 60
km wide, of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) along the lower Congo river.
Cabinda borders the Congo Republic to the north and north-northeast and the
DRC to the east and south. The town of Cabinda is the chief population centre.
According to a 1995 census, Cabinda has an estimated population of 600,000,
approximately 400,000 of whom live in neighbouring countries. Population estimates
are, however, highly unreliable.
Click here for an enlarged version of the above map
Consisting largely of tropical forest, Cabinda produces hardwoods,
coffee, cocoa, crude rubber and palm oil. The product for which it is best known,
however, is its oil, which has given it the nickname, “the Kuwait of Africa”.
Cabinda’s petroleum production from its considerable offshore reserves
now accounts for more than half of Angola’s output. Most of the oil along
its coast was discovered by the Cabinda Gulf Oil Company (CABCOG) from 1968
onwards.
Global Witness, reporting in 2002,
23 gives the following
commentary on the role of the oil sector in Angola:
The national economy is highly dependent on the oil sector, which
accounts for approximately 86.5% of government’s revenues. Angola’s
off-shore is considered a “world-class” area for oil production,
with some two-thirds of exploration wells striking oil, compared to a 50%
success rate for Nigeria’s deep offshore and a global average of around
15%… Angola’s oil production for 2000 remained at approximately
750,000 barrels per day. Analysts forecast this to rise to around 900,000
bpd by 2002.
Conservative estimates are that Cabinda accounts for close to 60% of the country’s
oil production, estimated at approximately 900,000 barrels a day, and it is
estimated that oil exports from the province are worth the equivalent of US$100,000
per annum for every Cabindan. Yet it remains one of the poorest provinces in
Angola. An agreement in 1996 between the national and provincial governments
stipulated that 10% of Cabinda’s taxes on oil revenues should be given
back to the province, but Cabindans often feel that these revenues are not benefiting
the population as a whole, largely because of corruption. Christian Aid reports
as follows:
Living conditions are not noticeably worse in Cabinda than in other
Angolan provinces, but the contrast between its poverty and the more obvious
wealth there has sparked more vocal dissent. The cost of living is high, since
Cabinda has no port facilities and consumer goods are flown from the capital,
Luanda, or trucked in from neighbouring countries. 24
The private sector, particularly the oil industry, has both affected and been
affected by the conflict. During the early days of Cabinda’s struggle,
the oil companies were perceived to be sympathetic to, if not supportive of,
Cabinda’s self-determination cause. In fact, as pointed out by Mabeko-Tali:
the interference of oil companies in the Cabindan dossier, in particular
after close to three decades, has equally confused perceptions on it…
the implications of the French ELF in the development of the “Congolese”
tendencies of FLEC, for example during 1974/1975, have had the tendency to
solidify the MPLA leaders’ almost schizophrenic view of the Cabindan
question: that everything results from external plots with the aim of usurping
the enclave’s riches, or simply from intentions by Cabinda’s two
neighbours of annexing Cabinda.25
Although its predominantly off-shore location has given it some protection,
the oil industry has suffered as a result of separatist action, mostly by FLEC-FAC
and FLEC-R. As Alex Vines emphasizes, “in Angola’s rich oil enclave
of Cabinda, separatists have specialized in the abduction of expatriate oil,
construction and timber workers. Over the last decade, this has made Cabinda
one of the most hazardous working environments outside Colombia.”
26
This strategy, used by the separatists to gain international attention, was
most evident in 1999 and 2000. During 1999, FLEC-R kidnapped four foreign workers
(two Portuguese and two French citizens), only to release them after several
months, having failed to attract the attention of the international community.
FLEC-FAC also increased its activities during 2000 with the more widely publicized
kidnapping of three Portuguese workers employed by a construction company, while
FLEC-R kidnapped another five Portuguese civilians. These hostages were not
freed until June 2001, following the diplomatic intervention of the governments
of Gabon and Congo Brazzaville.
More recently there have been allegations that Cabinda Gulf employees suspected
of collaboration with the separatists have undergone interrogation. However,
oil companies try their best to remain detached. In a recent interview to the
press, John Gass, General Manager of Cabinda Gulf and Chevron Texaco’s
Southern Africa Unit, said that his company does not get involved “in the
political side of things” and that it tries to cooperate with law enforcement
officials “as it would in other countries”. He added that “frankly,
we are not aware… of any human rights abuses occurring” and that he
did not know “how prisoners are treated in Cabinda or Angola or a lot of
places we do business, but that hasn’t been a big issue for us.”
27
WHO'S WHO IN CABINDA? A BRIEF HISTORY
One of the characteristics of the Cabindan independence movement is its constant
fragmentation, into smaller and smaller factions, in a process which is not
totally fomented by the Angolan government but is undoubtedly encouraged and
duly exploited by it.
28
In the early 1960s, several movements advocating a separate status
for Cabinda came into being. The MLEC (Movement for the Liberation of the Enclave
of Cabinda) was formed in 1960 under the leadership of Luis Ranque Franque.
Resulting from the merger of various émigré associations in Brazzaville,
the MLEC rapidly became the most prominent of the separatist movements. A further
group was the Alliama (Alliance of the Mayombe), representing the Mayombe, a
small minority of the population. In an important development, these movements
united in August 1963 to form a common, united front. They called themselves
the FLEC (Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda), and the leadership
role was taken by the MLEC’s Ranque Franque.
29 Mimicking the
strategy adopted by the FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola),
FLEC went on to create a “government of Cabinda in exile” on 10 January
1967.
30
However, in marked contrast with the FNLA, the FLEC’s efforts to mobilize
international support for its “government in exile” met with little
success. In fact, the majority of OAU members, concerned that this could encourage
separatism elsewhere on the Continent and duly committed to the sanctity of
African state borders, firmly rejected recognition of the FLEC’s government
in exile.
31 This did not prevent Gabon, Uganda and the Central African
Republic, among others, from openly supporting the FLEC. More importantly, the
FLEC received moral, organizational and material support from Zaire (now the
DRC) and Congo-Brazzaville, its neighbours. The FLEC itself came into being
partly as a result of the support of Congo-Brazzaville’s President Youlou
for the merger of Cabinda’s separatist movements in Pointe Noire in 1963.
The support of these two countries was largely prompted by their interest in
Cabinda’s rich potential.
Later, in the course of Angola’s turbulent decolonisation process, Ranque
Franque proclaimed the independence of the “Republic of Cabinda” in
Kampala on 1 August 1975 at an OAU summit which was discussing Angola at that
precise moment.
32 Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko called for a
referendum on the future of the Cabinda enclave, in which he received the expected
support of President Henri Lopes of Congo-Brazzaville. Lopes is reported to
have said at the time that “Cabinda exists as a reality and is historically
and geographically different from Angola.”
It is this external interference that has, more than anything else, shaped and
entrenched Luanda’s policy on the enclave over the years. In fact, the
spectre of Cabinda’s occupation by one of its neighbours has been at the
epicentre of Luanda’s policy on Cabinda all along. Thus, as Mabeko-Tali
emphasizes, “whatever scenario is adopted for surpassing the Cabindan problem,
neighbouring countries are impossible to circumvent.”
33 The
regional context, of course, changed dramatically in the late 1990s, particularly
in Congo-Brazzaville and the DRC—a change that was actively pursued by
Luanda. If previous regimes were at one time sympathetic to the Cabinda cause,
particularly that of Pascal Lissouba in Brazzaville, which actively supported
it materially and diplomatically, this situation does not pertain today. This
may, of course, change if these regimes change.
Thus when, in January 1975, Angola’s three liberation movements (MPLA,
FNLA and UNITA) met with the colonial power in Alvor, Portugal, to establish
the modalities of the transition to independence, FLEC was not invited. Subsequently,
and for much of the 1970s and 1980s, FLEC operated a low intensity, guerrilla-type
war, attacking government troops and economic targets or creating havoc by kidnapping
foreign employees working in the province’s oil and construction businesses.
In fact, for the first 15 years of Angola’s independence, the government
had, at any point, approximately 2,000 troops stationed in Cabinda.
The process of fragmentation
The multiple splits and divisions experienced by FLEC from the time of its formation
in the early 1960s make its history difficult to follow. In 1977, a split with
the original FLEC led by Ranque Franque gave rise to the creation of the CMLC
(Military Command for the Liberation of Cabinda). During the 1980s, further
divisions arose with the formation of the FLEC-FAC and FLEC-R, each pursuing
different strategies for independence. FLEC-R is reported to have been created
in 1984 under the leadership of Antonio Bento Bembe.
During the 1992 elections, several of these factions urged Cabindans to boycott
the elections. As a result, only between 7% and 12% of Cabindans voted in what
was the first (and until now the only) democratic election in Angola. The boycott
strategy was largely a reaction to the law on political parties enacted in May
1991, which effectively disqualified any of Cabinda’s movements or political
groupings from becoming candidates in the Parliamentary elections. This law
dictates that, in order to be allowed to register, a party must have support
in at least 10 of the 18 provinces. In addition, it clearly prohibits the formation
of parties that are “local and regional in character, foster tribalism,
racism, regionalism or other forms of discrimination against citizens or affect
national unity and territorial integrity.” Not surprisingly, the vast majority
of Cabindan separatists saw the 1992 elections as a matter for Angolans, not
Cabindans.
While the various factions of the FLEC refused to be part of Angola’s
first multi-party elections, Luis Ranque Franque adopted a more conciliatory
tone vis-à-vis the government in Luanda, suggesting that open dialogue
was perhaps the best strategy. Received by the President and the government,
Franque moved closer to the government’s proposal of a special status for
the province. A solution along the lines of a “large autonomy” (following
the Portuguese model of governance in the Madeira and Azores archipelagos) was
considered. One of the practical achievements of this
rapprochement was
that the government authorized the opening of a FLEC office in Cabinda, which
later became known as the “FLEC Interior”, under the co-ordination
of Belchior Tati.
34
When full-scale civil war erupted after Savimbi’s rejection of the election
results, FLEC-FAC escalated its activities. This prompted the government to
deploy close on 15,000 troops in the province at the beginning of 1993. By mid-1993,
FLEC-FAC was thought to be in control of much of the rural interior of Cabinda,
but not of Cabinda town, home to one-half of the enclave’s population.
FLEC-FAC achieved this with a force reported to be no larger than 600 to 1,000
armed men. The escalation of hostilities in Cabinda at a time when the government
was facing its toughest military challenge yet from UNITA, prompted the President
to announce, in March 1994, that talks with FLEC-FAC were about to begin. These
talks did not, however, take place.
During 1997 and 1998, FAA operations in Cabinda increased, particularly in villages
suspected of supporting the separatists. The situation rapidly deteriorated,
with FLEC-FAC and FLEC-R responding in kind. Sir Nigel Rodley, Special Rapporteur
of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, informed the government of
Angola on 3 September 1998 that he had “received information concerning
a likely deterioration of the situation in the enclave of Cabinda since the
beginning of 1997.” Sir Rodley’s report continues as follows:
According to that information, acts of torture and ill-treatment
committed in connection with the conflict in that area by soldiers of the
regular army, as well as by members of the paramilitary group of the Polícia
da Intervencão Rápida (PIR) (Rapid Intervention Police), were
said to be very widespread. The acts were reportedly committed either against
persons from whom the soldiers were trying to obtain information, or against
the civilian population in reprisal for armed attacks by separatist groups,
especially various factions of the Frente para Libertação do
Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC) (Cabinda Enclave Liberation Front). They were also
believed to be aimed at punishing or intimidating political opponents. In
areas not directly affected by the conflict, the victims of such acts were
persons suspected of supporting FLEC policies or disobeying Government orders.35
Armed secessionists and their political goals
FLEC-FAC has created a ‘virtual’ Federal Republic of Cabinda under
the Presidency of N’Zita Henriques Tiago. In its website, it claims to
be committed to building a “Cabinda Republic” in which “freedom,
opportunity, prosperity and civil society flourish.”
36 This
Federal Republic, with Tchiowa (Cabinda town) as its capital city, would be
administratively made up of seven districts, with a system of government which
the website simply describes as a “true democracy” and a legal system
based on traditional N’Goyo law. In this ‘virtual’ republic,
the government would be as follows,
The Federal Government of Cabindais the only Authority in and for
the Republic State/Territory/Nation/Country of Cabinda. Any activity, commercial,
public or private, unless it has the full permission of the Senior Executive
of the Federal Government in and for the Country of Cabinda, is illegal. We
the Sovereign Power in and for Cabinda, Sovereign Authority has it is the
will of the Cabindan People, We the Popular acclaimed Government under the
leadership ofHE Dom N’Zita Henriques Tiago, President of the Government
and President of all Cabindans [sic]. The Cabindan Armed Forces (FAC) have
resisted an enemy that has Robed, Raped and Murdered for more than 25 years
our People [sic]. Nevertheless we do control more than 85% of the total Territory
of our Country. We therefore invite the international business community to
invest in Cabinda, at the present. We are accepting applications for commercial
joint ventures and others types of co-operation in the Commercial, Public
and Military areas. All inquiries should be forwarded to the following e-mail
This e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it
[sic]37
However, Cabinda’s Federal Republic exists only on paper. In fact, not
only have the most prominent military commanders of the FLEC-FAC now surrendered
to the government, but this movement has been engulfed in controversy for the
past several months. FLEC-FAC’s External Relations Secretary, Liberal Nuno,
has recently decided to withdraw his political support for the leader of the
movement, President N’Zita Tiago. In a highly publicized event in Lisbon,
Liberal Nuno accused the N’Zita Tiago of being the greatest obstacle to
peace in the province by persisting in a logic of war. He also accused Tiago
of “not having a strategy, programme, or a credible project leading to
the independence of the territory.”
38 As evidence, he cited
the position taken by N’Zita Tiago at a meeting with government officials
in Paris on 9 January 2003, when he refused to accept some form of autonomy
for Cabinda. FLEC-FAC’s secretary-general, Alexandre Tati, promptly dismissed
Nuno’s declarations, accusing Liberal Nuno of being an agent of the Angolan
government, charged with the task of eliminating N’Zita Tiago. In fact,
claimed Tati, Liberal Nuno had attempted to bribe the President with the suggestion
that he should drop his demands and accept the conditions imposed by the Angolan
government in exchange for a sum of US$20 million.
39 So far, it is
unclear to what extent this has further divided a movement that has experienced
serious setbacks on the battlefield.
FLEC-R’s Cabindan government in exile
With its headquarters in France, FLEC-R has also created a government in exile,
whose self-appointed prime minister is the Reverend Anny Antônio da Silva
Kitembo. This government in exile is described in a “Charter of the Front
for the Liberation of the State of Cabinda”. According to article 7 of
the charter:
the FLEC’s main objective is the struggle for liberation by
diplomatic means, because of the overwhelming armaments of Angola on our National
Territory and as a consequence of the awake of consciousness of the Cabindese
People to claim their Human and Citizens Rights in their National Territory.
[sic]
However, article 8 states that “the mission of our army of liberation is
to defend our country as soon as it is necessary, beside diplomatic means on
which we settle our present struggle, also the enemy is over-armed” [sic].
The programme of this fictional “Cabindese Government in Exile” maintains
that the government’s objective is to “gain acceptance of the rights
of the people of Cabinda to autodetermination and independence” [sic].
A quick glance at the FLEC-R’s web page reveals that several Ministerial
positions have also been created. On 25 April 2003, FLEC-R’s Prime Minister
in Exile called on Portugal to help the territory conduct a plebiscite on the
territory’s future, since FLEC-R still sees Cabinda as a Portuguese protectorate.
40
Today’s FLEC-R has, however, been weakened by multiple splits. The creation
of a “FLEC-Platform” broke the movement and its leadership in two.
Antonio Bento Bembe now leads FLEC-Platform, and Anny da Silva Kitembo, FLEC-R.
FLEC-Platform claims to be the natural descendant of the original FLEC created
by Luis Ranque Franque in the early 1960s. It sees itself as flowing from the
transformation of the “old” Renewed faction to include (since April
2002) all internal and external forces, civil society and the churches. However,
according to most observers, FLEC-Platform is no more than a loose coalition.
FLEC-R has evinced a stronger inclination to accept some sort of autonomy for
Cabinda and has on several occasions called for a ceasefire. It has also been
engaged in a number of attempts at negotiation (Libreville in 1995, for example).
Roots of incompatibility I: Conflicting views on Cabinda
Gallant combatants of the Angolan Armed Forces, the National police, notably
our Ninjas [members of the Rapid Intervention Police] deployed in various parts
of the country, and in particular those fighting to eradicate terrorism in our
beautiful province of Cabinda. We renew our hope that you will succeed in your
noble mission. The war in Cabinda will be settled in a matter of days. You should
continue to show aggressiveness, and mercilessly annihilate FLEC-FAC and FLEC-Renewed
terrorists. We would like to congratulate you in your bravery. The days of the
war in Cabinda are numbered.
41
To speak of the Cabinda conflict is to speak firstly of the political and military
aggression against the Cabindan people, and secondly of the will of Cabindans
to exist as a mature and free people, which drives them to put up political,
military, and cultural resistance throughout the years of forced Angolanisation.
FLEC is simply a symbol of this resistance. FLEC may be important historically,
but the Cabindan people’s desire for independence has an existence quite
separate from that of FLEC.
42
The conflict in Cabinda has been, and still is, based on two irreconcilable
positions. For the Angolan government, and perhaps for the vast majority of
Angolans outside of Cabinda, the province is an integral part of the country.
Indeed, Cabinda is part of the national imagery, expressed in the popular designation
of the country as “Angola from Cabinda to Cunene”. Luanda has made
it clear that it will not contemplate secession on the part of Cabinda. The
government’s continued commitment to national unity was expressed by the
MPLA’s Secretary-General João Lourenço as recently as 11
May 2003. Visiting what used to be the heart of the FLEC-FAC’s territory,
the town of Buco-Zau, Lourenço said, “the secret to successive MPLA’s
victories, which many analysts [still] try to uncover, is precisely the principle
of national unity.”
43 Just two days earlier, the Secretary-General
had addressed the press on the issue of Cabinda, claiming that the government
had a clear plan of action for Cabinda based on negotiations involving all Cabindan
armed factions. He then posed the following challenge: “it is necessary
that the so-called separatist forces in Cabinda organize themselves and be prepared
for this dialogue.”
44
At the opposite pole, Cabindan separatists claim that the enclave has its own
distinct, separate identity, history and culture. The separatists consider that
Cabinda was illegally occupied by the MPLA regime following Angola’s independence
in 1975. The various movements as well as the individuals who have fought for
Cabinda’s self-determination share a common interpretation of this history,
according to which,
MarxistMPLA troops invaded Cabinda via Point Noirein 11 November
1975. Cabinda [had been]… a Portuguese Protectorate since the signing
of the Treaty of Simulambuco in 1885, and became known as the Portuguese Congo.
Marxist MPLA troops from Angola are still occupyingCabinda. The Republic of
Cabinda was never legally integrated into Angola after the end of the Portuguese
presence in 1975.45
The consequences of this interpretation of history are profound and far from
clear. In fact, it is precisely on the issue of how to address Cabinda’s
specificity that Cabindans fail to come to agreement. And this, more than anything
else, goes a long way towards explaining why the various factions fail to unite
and speak with a single voice. As Mabeko-Tali has rightly emphasized, the whole
question revolves around the issue of autonomy versus independence. Consequently,
“if the opposition between the government and the independentists on this
issue seems logical, the divisions of the former seem to deepen as regards a
counter-project to be suggested to Luanda.”
46 Autonomy versus
independence seems to be the choice which Cabindans themselves are incapable
of reaching agreement on.
Moreover, some separatists demand recognition as an independent state as a pre-condition
for negotiating. FLEC-FAC’s motto ‘We wish Peace for Angola and wish
that Angola leave us in Peace’, reflects this stance. N’Zita Tiago,
leader of the FLEC-FAC, made this clear during an interview on 18 March 2001
when he insisted that Cabinda “has never been a Portuguese colony, but
a protectorate. The war we have been waging until now takes place exclusively
in the name of total and unconditional independence.”
47 FLEC-FAC’s
arguments in defence of self-determination are identical to those of the FLEC-R.
According to its website, FLEC-R considers that at the time of decolonisation,
Cabinda was a protectorate and not a colony, and was therefore subjected to
only 90 years of colonial rule and not the 500 years experienced by Angola.
The argumentation used by all separatist factions has been extensively developed
in a study on the legal aspects of the self-determination argument commissioned
by the “original” FLEC in the 1970s. The (undisclosed
48)
author (or authors) of this study discusses three sets of arguments for Cabinda’s
self-determination: the different legal circumstances in which Angola and Cabinda
became part of Portugal; the ethnic, cultural and linguistic differences between
the populations of the two territories (partly a result of their geographical
separation) and, finally, Portuguese legislation.
49 A number of observations
on the recent history of Cabinda are sketched at this point.
The legal and historical basis for self-determination
Portugal first claimed sovereignty over Cabinda in the February 1885 Treaty
of Simulanbuco,
50 which gave Cabinda the status of a protectorate
of the Portuguese Crown under the request of “the princes and governors
of Cabinda”.
51 This is often the basis upon which the legal
and historical arguments in defence of self-determination are constructed. Article
1, for example, states, “the princes and chiefs and their successors declare,
voluntarily, their recognition of Portuguese sovereignty, placing under the
protectorate of this nation all the territories by them governed” [sic].
Article 2, which is often used in separatist arguments, goes even further: “Portugal
is obliged to maintain the integrity of the territories placed under its protection.”
FLEC-R’s case, for instance, rests on the fact that the above-mentioned
treaty was signed between the emissaries of the Portuguese crown and the princes
and notables of Cabinda, giving rise to not one, but three protectorates: Cacongo,
Loango and Ngoio.
The FLEC-commissioned study starts by discussing whether the princes and notables
of Cabinda actually understood what they were signing. Would concepts such as
‘sovereignty’, ‘subject of the Portuguese Crown’ or ‘Protectorate’
have meant anything to Cabinda’s 19th century elites? According to this
study, they “understood that Portugal assured them, at least, the maintenance
of their authority and the integrity of their country.”
52 In
any case, the legal argument seems to revolve around whether or not the Treaty
of Simulanbuco gives Cabinda the status of a ‘protectorate’ under
modern international law. Proponents of the self-determination cause often cite
the French protectorates of Tunisia and Morocco as comparable examples. On this
view, the 1956 ‘annexation’ of Cabinda, an ‘international protectorate’,
could be of doubtful legal status. However, the legal argument is complicated
by the fact that, quoting the above-mentioned study, “it seems to me questionable
whether the Treaty of Simulanbuco was signed between two States under international
law, Portugal and Cabinda, the latter not having at the time of the signature,
international recognition.” On this view, conventions signed by local Chiefs
would not have had the character of an International Treaty.
Nevertheless, the ‘colonial protectorate’ treaty did confirm the authority
of Cabinda’s chiefs, and assured them of the integrity of their territory.
The 1956 administrative union of the two territories and the subsequent confirmation
of Cabinda as part of Angola in the 1975 Alvor Accords would thus have been
unconstitutional according to this reading.
53
Angolan sociologist Paulo de Carvalho refutes these arguments in an article
in the Portuguese
Diario Economico dated 6 April 2001. Carvalho makes
use of Conceição Neto’s argument that, from an international
law point of view, the old protectorate treaties were merely a way of legitimising
the appropriation of territories in Africa and therefore the three treaties
cannot be seen as having the legal value of international conventions. Carvalho
develops this argument as follows:
Even without this detail, one must bear in mind that the Portuguese
“protectorate” of Cabinda ceased [to exist] after the unilateral
decision by Portugal to integrate the territory of Cabinda in the colony of
Angola… from administrative residence and seat of the district of the
Congo (1887), Cabinda became a circumscription [circunscrição]
(1913) and district (1917-1921). In 1932, the intendancy [intendência]
of Cabinda became subordinate to government of the colony of Angola, and in
1934 the district of Cabinda was again created, now under the dependency of
Luanda’s governor. In 1945 the district of Cabinda is created in the
way that it would exist until 1974, with a governor subordinated to the government
of the colony of Angola.54
Cultural and ethnic arguments for self-determination
The next set of arguments for self-determination is based on Cabindans’
cultural and ethnic specificity. Prior to the Treaty of Simulambuco, three main
kingdoms existed in what we refer today as Cabinda: Cacongo, Ngoyo and Loango.
From an ethnic point of view, the Cabindans belong to the Bakongo ethnicity
and the Kikongo ethno-linguistic group. The Bakongo comprise the majority of
the population in both Uige and Zaire Provinces of Angola. However, this shared
ancestry did not prevent Cabindans from developing a very different culture
as well as a variant of the Kikongo language. It is, of course, not our intention
to debate here whether Cabindans’ claim to cultural and ethnic specificity
is a valid one, if ever such an external approach could be used for what in
effect is a subjective and highly personal issue. There have, in any event,
been numerous in-depth anthropological works that have dealt with the issue.
From the point of view of the current situation, it is more pertinent to highlight
the fact that Cabindans, in their vast majority, consider themselves different,
separate and not Angolan.
The FLEC study took this external approach to conclude that Cabindans
are, in fact, “ethnically” different from other Angolans. The belief
regarding the uniqueness of a Cabindan identity, and perhaps more importantly,
its contrast with an “Angolan” identity is a pervasive one in Cabinda.
In fact, as recently as 8 and 9 July 2003, the uniqueness of a Cabindan identity
was defended by the majority of participants at a conference held in Cabinda
and organized by the Open Society Foundation under the theme “A Common
Vision for Cabinda”. As the final report to this conference points out,
“the identity of Cabindans as being unique from that of Angolans was also
a common theme”, a fact made more relevant because close to 1 500 Cabindans
of different political and social backgrounds participated in the event.
55
In a presentation entitled “Cabindan Identity in the Angola Context”,
sociologist Jose Marcos Mavungo
highlighted the tension that exists today in Cabinda as a result
of the imposition of an Angolan identity on the Cabindans on the one hand,
and on the other, the attempt to retain Cabindan traditions.56
The argument of ethno-cultural specificity as a basis for self-determination
is, and has been, vehemently opposed in Luanda, by both the government and several
prominent intellectuals and civil society personalities. The MPLA’s Secretary-General,
for example, has clearly characterized the argument as “not enough to grant
it independence, because all the provinces in the country have specific cultures.”
57
This seems to be the usual reply: that although Cabindans may, indeed. evidence
a different history, culture and language, Angola as a nation composed of a
mosaic of peoples and languages, must be grounded on a common vision, where
ethno-cultural differences do not jeopardise the unity of the State. Once again,
we turn to Paulo de Carvalho’s critique, which summarizes the negation
of ethno-cultural specificity as the sole basis for the Cabindans’ self-determination
in the following terms:
Both the historical elements as well as those of an ethnic and
linguistic nature, place the Cabindans in the same plain as some of Angola’s
other ethnic groups. One could even deduct [sic] that, for example the Khoi-Khoi
(from an ethno-linguistic point of view) and the Lunda-Cokwe (from a historical
point of view) have more arguments to justify their self-determination…
It is wrong to view Angola’s populations as an indivisible whole,
in the same way that it is not anthropologically correct to consider Cabinda
on one side and Angola on the other [author’s emphasis]. 58
Unity as a reason for self-determination
The final set of arguments presented in the FLEC study deals with the issue
of whether Cabindans evidence a will to live together. This was, in fact, one
of the most important arguments in the “original” FLEC discourse.
At the time the study was undertaken, FLEC was united and seemed to represent
the aims of the Cabinda people as a whole. Indeed, the very fact that FLEC was
able to bring all Cabinda’s independence movements together in a common
front in 1963 is interpreted by the author of the study as demonstrating a genuine
will for independence, especially when contrasted with the lack of unity between
Angola’s liberation movements – the MPLA, the FNLA and UNITA. This
argument does not, however, apply today, with the multiple splits, cleavages
and rivalry between the various factions that purport to fight for Cabinda’s
independence. Nevertheless, at the root of this argument is the often-expressed
need for a referendum that would gauge the will of the Cabindan people to become
independent. Yet here, as before, the disagreement between the separatists and
the government is profound. While the government of Angola sees such a referendum
as a question of national importance, implying that all Angolans should vote,
Cabindan separatists demand that only Cabinda’s population should be part
of such an exercise. The practical implications of each approach are obvious.
ROOTS OF INCOMPATIBILITY II: FAILED ATTEMPTS AT PEACEFUL RESOLUTION
The history of failed attempts at conflict resolution has also contributed to
a deep-seated mistrust between all involved. Negotiations between the government
and the various Cabindan factions began during the 1980s. However, as Mabeko-Tali
points out:
during the 1980s these negotiations were characterised by an apparent
lack of will by the Angolan government to debate the central issue and respond,
without ambiguity, to the question clearly posed by the independentist groups,
that of the future of the enclave.
Against Cabindan’s independence arguments, the government spoke about a
“policy of forgiveness” and of “national reconciliation”.
This was the case with a series of meetings held in Pointe-Noire and Luanda
between the government and several “independentist” factions from
1986 to 1989.
59
Similarly, during the 1990s several meetings took place between the factions
and the Angolan government under the auspices of Gabon’s President Omar
Bongo. Angola’s former Minister of the Interior, Santana Andre Pitra, better
known as “Petrov” and himself a Cabindan, led the negotiations for
the central government. An immovable obstacle to these efforts, as in so many
other instances, was the central issue of recognition. The Angolan government
required that the issue of Angola’s sovereignty over the enclave be accepted
by all; for the separatists, the issue of the future of the enclave was the
priority.
60 However, if anything at all substantial can be said to
have resulted from the various attempts at negotiation throughout the years,
it is precisely that the Cabinda issue has ceased to be one of “reconciliation”
or “forgiveness”, but one of working out the future status of Cabinda,
based in part on a recognition of the territory’s singular nature.
61
Early in 2001, the Angolan President once again suggested that plans were under
way to grant Cabinda greater autonomy. However, in February 2001 the FAA started
its military operations in the province in response to heightened separatist
activity. In fact, some observers believed that the intensification of separatist
activity could actually culminate in the demise of the various armed factions,
which would be confronted with the combined pressure of a better-equipped Angolan
military force and closer co-operation between Luanda and the rebels’ former
allies in Congo-Brazzaville and the DRC. The separatist cause had undoubtedly
been greatly weakened after the downfall of Mobutu and the re-seizure of power
by Denis Sassou-Nguesso in Congo-Brazzaville. In fact, Angola’s intervention
in Congo-Brazzaville in support of Sassou-Nguesso was largely a consequence
of that country’s support for both UNITA and the Cabindan separatists.
During the early part of 2001, the government-controlled media claimed
that the FLEC-FAC faction had surrendered under the terms of a government amnesty.
Despite this claim, however, Angola’s Minister of the Interior (and now
Prime Minister) Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos, once again appealed to
the FLEC separatists in August 2001 to end hostilities so that a peaceful solution
to the “Cabinda problem” could be found. This led to exploratory contacts
between the leaders of the FLEC-FAC and the government in December 2001. Although
these were “talks about talks” – that is, on the possibility
and modalities of negotiations – there was no progress beyond the initial
contact. In early 2002, the government expressed its willingness to hold “broad
consultations” on the status of Cabinda, but the FLEC-Renewed faction saw
any such dialogue as premature. Any possibility of an immediate reconciliation
over the status of the province then came to an abrupt halt following a major
offensive launched by the FAA in October 2002.
Mabeko-Tali has suggested that the government’s lack of concrete action
in both the political and the diplomatic arenas is matched by the independence
movement’s lack of a “structuring dynamic” that would be capable
of reducing the divisions that undermine the movement as a whole.
62
While the FAA was stepping up its counter-insurgency operation, President Eduardo
dos Santos declared in October 2002 that a peaceful solution to the conflict
in Cabinda, through the granting of autonomy to the province, was in sight.
Father Raul Tati, Vicar-General of the Diocese of Cabinda and a well-known advocate
of the Cabindan self-determination cause, commented as follows on the latest
developments in the province:
The latest developments in the enclave, especially the recent military
offensive, have revealed the real intentions of the Dos Santos regime in relation
to Cabinda and the Cabindans. At the moment, any attentive observer can easily
come to the following conclusions: (1) President dos Santos has shown that
he never had any intention of finding a peaceful solution to the Cabinda problem;
his promises are just talk aimed at deceiving those who know no better; (2)
he displays complete disdain and disrespect for the Cabindan people, whose
reactions can be seen in the report on human rights in Cabinda, published
in Luanda and in Cabinda last December; it is clear that this man has never
been a friend of the Cabindan people; (3) he is prepared to take these atrocities
as far as he sees necessary so as to safeguard petroleum interests in the
region…63
President dos Santos has gone so far as to recognize that a multi-disciplinary
approach is necessary, including “dialogue with the people and personnel
in the region to giving better attention to economic and social issues.”
The President has also conceded that “the demands that arise are justified
by the fact that due attention has not been paid to the resolution of local
problems.”
64 The government says it would consider new contacts
but claims its opponents are so fragmented that there is no single “valid
interlocutor” with which it can negotiate. If so, it is a situation that
the government has itself fuelled by its alleged involvement in the fragmentation
of the FLEC.
65 FLEC-FAC maintains that ”to the outside world,
the government says it is prepared to negotiate but all evidence points to a
concerted effort to destroy the strongholds of the Cabinda Armed Forces (FAC).”
66
This oscillation between conflict escalation and pronouncements in favour of
a peaceful and negotiated end to the conflict has been a permanent characteristic
of the conflict. Thus, various attempts at preliminary talks (pre-negotiation
sessions) have failed to create the necessary conditions for a negotiated settlement.
In fact, some consider that this oscillation is a deliberate strategy by Luanda
to create friction within the separatist cause. Discussing the beginning of
negotiations during the mid 1980s, Mabeko-Tali, states that “such oscillation
caused an intense cycle of divisions between the factions, and even within the
factions.”
67 One example is the September 1995 ceasefire agreement
between the Angolan government and the FLEC-R faction, which failed to usher
in a process of negotiations on the future of the enclave. Also, on 15 May 1999,
a radio station in Gabon reported that a ceasefire agreement had been signed
between the government and FLEC-FAC.
68
As recently as 21 September 2002, just before the latest escalation of hostilities,
the FLEC/FAC handed over a peace proposal to Ibrahim Gambari; to the Vatican
representative in Angola; and to the American, Portuguese, Russian and South
African embassies in Luanda. The ten-point document sets out the modalities
of a ceasefire leading to an “institutional dialogue” to resolve the
conflict, with direct meetings between the FLEC-FAC and the government. It also
proposes the institution of autonomous transitional state organs in the region;
the installation of a transitional government, and the signing of a peace and
harmony pact. It further suggests a referendum and that a solemn proclamation
of the territorial sovereignty of Cabinda be made. Finally, it proposes the
realization of the first legislative elections and the choice of a Chief of
State for the Cabinda State.
69
On 2 May 2003, General Kundy Payhama, Angola’s Defence Minister, made an
appeal to all armed factions in Cabinda, particularly FLEC-FAC and FLEC-R. For
the Minister, the time had come for all separatist groups to abandon their arms
and join the country’s reconstruction process since “time waits on
no one and opportunities do not come often”. Payhama is further quoted
as saying that these armed separatist groups are led by “tribal people
whose lines of action are not in accordance with the country’s constitutional
order.”
70 Liberal Nuno replied, pessimistically, on 25 March
2003:
Mr Anibal Rocha, the governor of Cabinda, announced on 19 February
2003 that the government was drafting a political plan of action that would
be placed before Cabinda’s liberation movements and civil society. We
are still waiting for the government to reveal its plan of action. Unfortunately,
given the situation on the ground FLEC has come to the conclusion that the
honourable governor was playing to the gallery.71
However, FLEC-FAC has evinced some interest in a negotiated settlement. On 7
April 2003, the FLEC-FAC representative in the Netherlands, Xavier Builo, told
IRIN that although independence was a “desirable solution to the ongoing
conflict”, his movement remained open to negotiations over the “future
status” of Cabinda. Builo referred to the meeting in Paris, emphasizing
that the government should commit itself to the protection of human rights in
the province. As to procedural issues, FLEC-FAC requested that SADC or the United
Nations be used in the settlement of Cabinda’s status within Angola.
72
On 21 April, N’Zita Tiago said a new front had been opened, that of diplomacy,
and that “the results of our diplomatic action are obtained through the
continued condemnation of actions against civilian populations in Cabinda.”
73
There were also reports that several separatist factions and individuals had
formed a FLEC-Platform to negotiate with the government under the leadership
of Antonio Bento Bembe, former leader of FLEC-R. This platform would include
FLEC-R, elements and organizations of civil society, and cadres in the interior
and exterior of Cabinda. In fact, at a session held between 7 and 9 September
2002, Antonio Bento Bembe was given the go-ahead by all constituents of the
Platform to initiate written contact with the government of Angola. However,
FLEC-FAC was not, as of the end of March 2003, part of this platform. Liberal
Nuno has evidently told the press that FLEC-FAC would have to be part of any
platform, for it was the only movement actively fighting in Cabinda.
This reinforces the often-used argument that, unless they unify, the various
factions will be unable to reach a solution with the government of Angola. In
fact, some pro-independence Cabindans regard this divisiveness as the underlying
cause of the Cabindans’ inability to negotiate with the government. D.
Paulino Fernandes Madeca, Bishop of Cabinda, has repeatedly said that the problems
between the various FLECs have contributed significantly to the protracted nature
of the conflict. Bishop Madeca, one of the staunchest supporters of the self-determination
cause, has tried several times to mediate between the factions, to no avail.
74
Attempts to create a single platform go back to 11 November 1991, when a conference
of cadres was held in Lisbon, and a “Supreme Co-ordination Council of the
FLEC” was formed, which included Ranque Franque, N’Zita Tiago and
Eduardo Sozinho. Mabeko-Tali makes the point that differences in strategy resulted
in the exacerbation of old contradictions, and this structure was never to function.
75
BEYOND FIRST-TRACK DIPLOMACY? OTHER ACTORS AND THEIR ROLES
The inability of the various factions of the FLEC to unite and create a common
front has created the opportunity for others to fill the political void in the
province. By becoming involved, several actors have gained increased prominence
as voices for the Cabindan people and, equally important, as perceived legitimate
interlocutors in a future peace process. Among the most visible have been the
Catholic Church, a number of civil society organizations and several prominent
individuals. Whereas the history of Cabinda’s secessionist movements cannot
be seen in isolation, in the sense that several of these other actors have been
instrumental and at times closely aligned with one faction or another, in recent
times these other Cabindan “voices” have gained increased importance
and prominence. Have they played, or will they be able to play a constructive
role in the political resolution of the conflict in Cabinda?
Cabinda’s churches began voicing their discontent about the humanitarian
consequences of the war in the early 1990s. At that time, Bishop Madeca called
for the intervention of the international community in a situation which he
famously compared to Nazism.
76 During 1993 and 1994, the Council
of the Diocese of Cabinda made repeated denunciations of the atrocities committed
by government forces in the province.
Opinions diverge as to the usefulness of the role that the Diocese of Cabinda
has played, particularly of the role of the Bishop himself. There are those
who consider that, as a result of its open defence of Cabinda’s self-determination
cause and its strong condemnation of government operations in the province,
the Catholic Church (in the pronouncements of Bishop Madeca and Father Jorge
Casimiro Congo, among others) has fuelled rather than ameliorated the conflict.
This is often contrasted with the role of the Catholic Church during most part
of the civil war in the “mainland”, which could at best be described
as one of “non-interference”.
Notwithstanding its staunch support of the self-determination cause, Cabinda’s
Diocese has actively pursued a peaceful, negotiated settlement to the war in
the province. In this regard, Mabeko-Tali points out that the Church’s
political stance reflects the fact that it has gradually become
the voice
of Cabinda’s civil society. This author views the church’s involvement
as having a dual impact on the conflict: on the one hand, by its very involvement,
the church has forced the government to raise the level and seriousness of its
approach to the problem; on the other hand, the church’s involvement has
multiplied the number of interlocutors in an already confused situation.
77
The Catholic Church undoubtedly has an important role to play, either by directly
mediating between the parties or by serving as the catalyst for the creation
of a true Cabindan platform, one which represents the majority of Cabindans.
In this regard, the Diocese of Cabinda can refer to the example set by the 1999
creation of the “Movement Pro Pace” which, for the first time in Angola’s
history, publicly brought together the main churches of Angola (Catholic and
Protestant of various denominations) as well as many non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs). An end to the civil war between
UNITA and the MPLA government was openly discussed at the July 2000 four-day
“Congress for Peace”, where close to 300 participants engaged in a
discussion of the peace process, for the first time outside the confines of
elite level politics. This ecumenical movement tried to shift the emphasis from
the top-down resolution approaches that had characterized the peace process
in Angola since 1991, to a wider but complementary bottom-up approach, whereby
all members of civil society could contribute to conflict resolution and peace-making.
There was a clear sense in civil society circles that although the end of armed
conflict was achieved on the battlefield, true reconciliation would come about
only if all Angolans participated in the peace process.
As for civil society, once a sector with little opportunity to voice its opinion
in political and security matters, it has boldly incorporated issues such as
peace-building and human rights into its mandate. From the early 1990s, but
in particular since 1999, Angolan civil society organizations (as well as the
various churches) have been increasingly prominent in community-level conflict
resolution initiatives and programmes; in the monitoring of human rights; and
in the monitoring of government policies and performance.
78 As Owen
pointed out in 2001, in a comprehensive analysis of the role of civil society
in Angola:
a weak civil society is beginning to organise itself and redefine
the boundaries of popular participation in questions of war, peace and development.
It is challenging the passive relationship between citizen and government
and articulating views about how to build sustainable peace.79
Because of the wide popular support for the self-determination cause, any solution
to the Cabinda issue requires that civil society be consulted. Father Victor
Tati calls for the “de-monopolization” and “de-politicization”
of the conflict in Cabinda in the following terms:
During the long years of political and military conflict, the Cabinda
problem has become over-politicised, becoming the exclusive preserve of political
elites, be they of the MPLA or of FLEC… Civil society and independent
voices have been shut out or made subordinate to those of the main parties.
After 28 years of conflict, despite the official propaganda, a solution has
not yet been found. The reason for this is very simple: as long as the Cabinda
problem is held hostage to politics and to political monopolies, the impasse
will continue even longer. The Cabinda problem is not only a political or
economic one, but above all a human problem, a moral problem which affects,
directly or indirectly, the lives of thousands of people.80
Several recent examples of the potential of civil society organizations to mobilize
and unite efforts to end Cabindans’ suffering can be highlighted. Undoubtedly,
the consortium that produced the “Terror in Cabinda” report is a case
in point. The ad hoc Commission for Human Rights in Cabinda (Comissão
Ad-Hoc para os Direitos Humanos em Cabinda) as well as the Coalition for Reconciliation,
Transparency and Citizenship (Coligação pela Reconciliação,
Transparencia e Cidadania) have brought the suffering of Cabindans to international
attention. The recent conference entitled “A Common Vision for Cabinda”,
which brought together close on 1 500 Cabindans, is also evidence of civil society’s
increasingly important role in the province. Underlying this conference was
the key objective of “strengthening the role of civil society in forging
a common vision for Cabinda and the way forward in resolving the conflict.”
81
What about Angolan opposition parties, especially UNITA? There is no doubt that
UNITA shares the government’s view that Cabinda’s secession is not
a possibility. UNITA’s recently elected President, Isaias Samakuva, has
argued that only dialogue will bring peace to the province. Nevertheless, he
shares the view that “the Cabinda problem is about economics” in that,
although “they live in one of the poorest provinces in the country, Cabindans
know that their oil deposits keep the country running”. Samakuva believes
that Cabindans should be “given the possibility of some kind of autonomy
while keeping the territory as part of Angola.”
82 Abel Civukuvuku,
another prominent UNITA official, has put it more bluntly:
[I]t is a matter of priority to demand that those who, through
their position of authority, hold the destiny of the country in their hands,
that they make every effort to bring a complete and definitive end to the
cycle of wars in Angola, putting an end to the Cabinda conflict and opting
for a peaceful resolution to its problems. If this means listening to the
voice of Cabindans, to heed their wishes, then let it be so. If we need to
move towards rethinking the kind of state that Angola will be, opening up
the possibility of autonomy for Cabinda, then so be it.83
Internationally, the separatists have often asked the Portuguese government
to intervene in the situation. In fact, the kidnapping of several Portuguese
workers in the enclave during 1999 and 2000 by both the FLEC-FAC and FLEC-R
had precisely the intention of forcing the Portuguese government to become
involved in the Cabinda issue. This was made clear when FLEC-FAC released
its last Portuguese hostage on 3 April 2001, and stated that “this was
an act of good-will to show the Portuguese government our good intentions,
and above all to clarify public opinion, nationally and internationally, that
FLEC-FAC should not be labelled as a terrorist group which kidnaps and demands
ransom.”84 On 24 September 2002, once again, the Portuguese
government was challenged by the Political Bureau of the FLEC to “assume
with courage a clear political position on the question of Cabinda.”85
However, Lisbon has historically viewed Cabinda as an internal Angolan problem.
This was clearly stated by Fernando Neves, Ambassador to Angola, on 27 March
2001.
CONCLUSION: IS CABINDA A TEST CASE FOR ANGOLA'S FUTURE?
It is widely believed that some kind of negotiated autonomy is the only solution
to the conflict in Cabinda. However, this is easier said than done. Firstly,
and on a substantive level, this requires that Cabindan separatists downgrade
their demands for independence and agree to negotiate on some kind of autonomy.
However, a negotiated settlement depends on the existence of legitimate and
representative interlocutors, able to negotiate for and on behalf of Cabindans
as a whole. Pinpointed by several analysts as the most serious obstacle to
the peaceful solution to the conflict, and one that has historically weakened
the secessionist cause, this is a challenging problem for which there should
be no pretension of a quick fix. This is largely because at the root of the
inability of the various FLEC’s factions to unite there are deep-seated
disagreements, personal agendas, constituency pressure, historical animosities,
and so forth. Observers have, for more than twenty years, recommended that
FLEC unite so that it can strengthen its case and negotiate with Luanda. However,
this has proved to be impossible and has, for the most part, been used by
the government to delay negotiations.
Recommendations should therefore move beyond simply stating unity as an absolute
necessity and critically inquire into the very reasons for its absence. The
requirement for a legitimate and credible interlocutor does not (and should
not) depend on the unification of Cabinda’s secessionist movements. There
are several other stakeholders, such as civil society organizations, the church
and individual Cabindans, who must be part of an enlarged and representative
peace process. More important than engaging in the often turbulent domain
of inter-party relations, support should be given to these other actors so
that a civil society platform grows. The inclusion of various stakeholders
in a negotiated settlement is necessary precisely because Cabindan secessionists
do not agree on what is to be negotiated with the government. Several of these
movements will not enter into a discussion unless government grants the enclave
outright independence. However, there are many Cabindan voices that have publicly
supported a solution based on the autonomy of the province, voices which,
as previously discussed, are echoed by a vast number of mainland Angolan voices.
The gradual development of a broad-based movement will undoubtedly serve as
a gauge for the aims and objectives of all Cabindans (including the various
FLEC factions).
Secondly, from the government side, a serious discussion around the parameters
of provincial or regional autonomy must be undertaken. If the political resolution
of the conflict in Cabinda entails the granting of special provisions and
perhaps privileges, other provinces will attempt to emulate the precedent
set by Cabinda, at a time when the government of Angola is extending state
administration to the whole of the country. While the current constitutional
revision has fallen short of treating decentralization in any meaningful way,
with the adoption of the somewhat fuzzy concept of ‘deconcentration’,
the issue of local government (poder local) must be seriously considered.
Judging by the protracted nature of the negotiations held in the National
Assembly on the constitutional issue of decentralization and deconcentration,
this will not be a straightforward task. In this regard, Angola’s constitutionalists
could look into decentralization models in other African countries and perhaps
move away from the Portuguese model, which bears little resemblance to the
conditions pertaining in Angola. Examples such as Mozambique, which will hold
its second municipal elections during November 2003, should be carefully examined.
Paramount among the various issues relating to ‘local governance’
is the election of provincial governors, a bold step which has yet to be implemented
in Mozambique and Angola, but that will surely emerge in the medium term in
both countries. As a result, the government of Angola will have to consider
Cabinda’s autonomy in the context of the whole country.
On the ground, and before any attempt at political negotiations takes
place, military activity must stop. Moreover, although the war seems to a
large extent over, there is no official ceasefire between the government and
any of the belligerents. And, here too, a parallel can be drawn from the end
of war in the mainland. The various belligerent factions of the FLEC are,
as UNITA was at the end of the civil war, largely destroyed and unable to
resume military activity. The military leaders of the FAA and all FLEC factions
should enter into exploratory contacts, following the example of the Luena
negotiations. This would build confidence at the military level and possibly
open the way for the negotiation of ceasefire and disengagement agreements
with all warring factions.
Such a pre-negotiation approach to the military aspects of the conflict could
be mirrored at other levels, such as the political and civil society levels
in Cabinda. Because political issues will inevitably form the backbone of
each party’s demands, and these are, at the moment, expressed in maximalist
(zero-sum) terms, there is a need for all parties to engage in a process that
will not escalate animosity, but will develop confidence-building and rapprochement.
If such pre-negotiations are kept out of the public eye, such an approach
could decrease the pressure on all stakeholders involved, enabling the various
parties involved to move from total incompatibility to a process of dialogue.
More importantly, the cessation of hostilities would allow for the flow of
much-needed humanitarian assistance into the province, opening the way for
the various organizations of the United Nations system with a presence in
Angola to increase their assistance to civilians facing hunger, disease, trauma
and loss of livelihood. In addition, the presence of international and non-governmental
organizations in the province would guarantee some kind of monitoring of human
rights violations on the part of all involved, providing a degree of security
to Cabinda’s population. In all these areas, the humanitarian community
in Angola has considerable experience which can be replicated in the province.
ENDNOTES
