Untitled Document
BURMA: OPEN LETTER TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON THE INDEPENDENT
REPORT
Supporting Burma/Myanmar’s National Reconciliation Process: Challenges
And Opportunities”, PRESENTED ON THE OCCASION OF THE “BURMA DAY
2005”
Open letter to:
Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for the External
Relations
Josè Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission
And to the Members of the European Parliament
5 April 2005
Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner,
President Barroso,
We are disconcerted and worried by the news that the European
Commission is currently considering an independent report on Burma recommending
that Europe restore diplomatic and economic relations with the Rangoon regime,
as well as recommence foreign aid programs.
This “alternative approach” proposed by the report
is based on its conclusion that the internal pro-democracy forces have failed
to offer an effective response to the regime. Their failure, says the report,
has further weakened and reduced the chances of restoring a civilian government
in the country; therefore, in their view, the only possible solution lies with
a policy of the EU recognising and opening discussions with the junta.
We believe that the “alternative approach” suggested
by the Taylor/Pederson report would legitimize and reinforce the military junta,
which has committed serious violations of international law and fundamental
human rights with total impunity.
Moreover, the European Commission is about to consider an analysis of the internal
political situation of the country that does not seem to take into account the
opinions and position of the internal opposition, led by the Nobel Peace Prize
winner Aung San Su Kyi, who remains under house arrest, and of the pro-democracy
Burmese movements who have been suffering violent repression for over 15 years.
Once again, we are witnessing the return of a “policy
of dialogue” with tyrannical regimes, in the vain hope that it will encourage
the start of a democratic process, while we know that this hope is, in fact,
groundless. As history has taught us - from Suharto to Milosevic - this “policy
of dialogue” can only contribute to the preservation of an anti-democratic,
repressive and freedom-less status quo.
We were surprised to learn that the representatives of the
National League for Democracy have not been invited to participate in such a
consultation; rather, they have been identified as one of the reasons of the
disorders, enhancing the administrative control by the Rangoon government and
in effectively hindering the birth of political change within the country.
The report, which is accorded so much credibility by the European Commission
and is very far away from the position and the decisions made by the European
Parliament, appears, then, to be more important than what is denounced by the
most reliable international human rights organizations such as Amnesty International,
Human Rights Watch and Freedom House. It also contradicts U.N. Secretary-General
Kofi Annan’s report, which affirms that no security agenda and no drive
for development will be successful unless they are based on the protection and
promotion of the universal values of the rule of law, human rights and democracy.
We would like to highlight that such an independent report
is being discussed during the same days when, at the Human Rights Commission
in Geneva, the situation of human rights in Burma is sharply criticised and
denounced and it is being affirmed that only strong pressure by world democracies
can avoid further violence and repression by the cruel Burmese military junta.
It is being discussed at a time when the presence in the same Commission of
tyrannies and dictatorships is being debated. It is being discussed at a time
when world democracies have recently created the Democracy Caucus and are about
to meet together in Santiago del Chile for the Third Ministerial Conference
of Communities of Democracies to create and reinforce a policy based on freedom,
democracy and the rule of law, rather than on real politik.
We consider it to be extremely important for the European Commission
to reconfirm the sanctions adopted by the same Commission and by a number of
resolutions of the European Parliament and the Council of Europe and to reconsider
the Taylor/Pedersen report, also in light of cooperation both with those international
human rights organizations most committed to the Burmese situation and with
the Burmese pro-democracy organizations that are under constant risk of deportation,
torture and death because of their work.
We believe that the Taylor/Pedersen should immediately be made
public and open to debate and analysis by the European Parliament, rather than
remain secret in the parallel agendas of the European bureaucracies.
Finally, we would like to re-launch the appeal begun by Aung San Suu Kyi, who
has been under house arrest since 2003, and by her supporters in the free world,
first of all the Western democracies: “Please, use your liberty to promote
ours”.
Signatories:
Transnational Radical Party (TRP)
Unrepresented Nations and People Organisation (UNPO)
No Peace Without Justice (NPWJ)
Hands off Cain (HOC)
International Antiprohibitionist League (IAL)
Radicali Italiani
The Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma (Altsean-Burma) urges
the European Commission to reject an "independent" report on Burma
for being anti-democratic and claiming that democracy will not benefit the country.
In addition, the human rights group also calls for the EC to postpone its April
5 Burma Day event until it is redesigned to be inclusive and representative.
The report and the Burma Day event, to be held in Brussels, has attracted growing
opposition from pro-democracy groups around the world.
The "independent" report for the European Commission
titled "Supporting Burma/Myanmars National Reconciliation Process: Challenges
and Opportunities" dated January 2005 essentially argues that democracy
will not benefit Burma. Such a bizarre claim flouts the proven desire of the
people of Burma for democracy and commensurate economic reform.
Ironically, this push to erode the EUs commitment to democracy
in Burma takes place when support for Burmese democracy is growing in Southeast
Asia.
The authors say the outlook for establishing a nominally democratic
government in the near future is positive. It is strange that they would recommend
the EU "nominally" support democracy, reconciliation and human rights
in Burma. Altsean-Burma questions whether the authors themselves would be content
to be subjected to life under the Burmese military regime, or a "nominally
democratic" government.
The October purge of Khin Nyunt resulted in the loss of the
main communication channels between the international community and the regime.
This has in turn led to a sense of desperation amongst those foreigners whose
careers depend on "engagement", who now advocate appeasement disguised
as engagement. They hope that such bribery will allow them a foot in the hardliners
door.
Altsean-Burma wishes to respond to some of the points made
in the report as follows:
1. The report dismisses Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD as being
incapable of drawing public support.
Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD drew huge crowds during her travels
throughout the country in 2002/2003. The signature campaign calling for her
release has already attracted 500,000 signatures in Burma, despite intimidation
and harassment by the military authorities.* This has reinforced awareness of
the national aspiration for democracy, as expressed in the 1990 elections, in
which the NLD won 82% of the parliamentary seats.
*(During a recent meeting at the NLD headquarters in Rangoon,
a member of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines discovered that 500,000
people has signed the petition calling for Aung San Suu Kyis release. When asked
whether the people were afraid to sign the petition, the NLD members replied
"Yes people are afraid but they are signing anyway").
2. They argue that civilians in Burma are not capable of managing
policy in a democratic Burma: "it is questionable whether a civilian government
would have the capacity to deal with the immense structural obstacles to peace
and development."
The argument is arrogant and condescending - the SPDC is clearly
inept at economic and policy reform. The SPDC has purposefully undermined capacity
development opportunities as a strategy to subjugate the people of Burma.
The authors appear to suggest that a regime which continues
to loot, rape, perpetrate forced labor and forcibly recruit child soldiers will
somehow transform into a capable government, once given enough money. This is
tantamount to saying the Ukrainian dictatorship should have been supported because
Ukrainians were too inexperienced for democracy.
3. They say Burma has "none of the markers of a country
likely to make an easy and permanent transition to a democratic regime."
Where there is "ethnic and religious conflict" or where the sense
of "national unity and identity" is weak, there are fewer prospects
for sustaining democracy.
This argument has long been used by the SPDC it ignores the
fact that the military junta has facilitated ethnic and religious conflicts
in order to justify their continued dominance.
It also ignores the inspiring solidarity that has been demonstrated
amongst ethnic nationality groups in recent years, for example the formation
of the Ethnic Nationalities Council (comprising ceasefire and non-ceasefire
groups), and the joint proposals of ceasefire groups to the National Convention.
All the major ethnic nationality groups have advocated for a united, federal
system.
4. They claim the difficulties experienced during Burmas early
experience with democracy underscores the need for a "strong" government.
This plays into the SPDC argument that the country is "too
fragile" to survive on its own under civilian rule. Strong governments
are those where the stakeholders are invested and people are represented. The
peoples will was made obvious in the Burmese general elections, and clearly
still applies.
It is disgraceful that a report that reeks of colonialism,
and to a certain extent, racism, can have currency today. Such assertions seem
to be informed by the attitude that somehow the Burmese are less deserving of
democracy and are less capable of sustaining democracy. Burmas early experience
with democracy took place over 4 decades ago. The report insults the democratic
aspirations of the people of Burma by attempting to overlook pro-democratic
developments that have occurred there in recent times.
At this point, Altsean-Burma wishes to acknowledge that while
many people from Burma may not have the ability to glibly spout political science
terms, they definitely know what they want, and have faced great dangers to
express their wishes.
5. The authors also make the hollow argument that enhanced
engagement is more likely to influence the SPDC and its institutions, a point
disproved by the experience of corporate engagement in the 1990s.
Further, they argue that to contribute to social change, international
actors need to be "engaged on the ground" in close proximity to the
people/institutions want to influence. EU policy should aim for constructive
dialogue with the SPDC.
UN Envoys including Razali Ismail, Sergio Pinheiro, several
Nobel Laureates and Thailand (through the Bangkok Process) have all attempted
constructive dialogue. In all of these cases, it has failed. Why should the
EU be any different? Constructive dialogue has only led to a tradition of broken
promises. Now, this tradition has afforded the SPDC enough confidence to implement
the National Convention a blatant attempt to constitutionalize their dictatorship.
6. One of their main arguments is that the country is more
open to foreign influence than previously: e.g. having senior officials exposed
to the outside world helped overcome their fear of foreigners.
This logic is based on the assumption that dictators like Milosevic,
Marcos and Suharto would have changed if only we had spoken nicely to them.
The regimes receptiveness to "foreign influence" has been a response
to pressure. Key overtures to engage foreign governments have taken place only
when there has been pressure. For instance, the regime paid significant amounts
to Washington lobbyists and publicists to "engage" the U.S. government
when they were subjected to U.S. pressure, in stark contrast to its contempt
for ASEAN, which pursues "constructive engagement".
On the business front, the SPDCs monopoly over Burmas formal
economy means that greater foreign business engagement will only enhance their
military expansion and their procurement of weapons.
7. They say that renewed pressure is more likely to disrupt
domestic process of change and further punish the general population.
The "domestic process of change" is a euphemism for
reconsolidation of the dictatorship. Nine political parties that won 91% of
the seats in the election are absent from the National Convention.
The authors use the KNU gentlemans ceasefire as an example
of a positive development. This overlooks the actual dynamics of a ceasefire
zone: Reports from Karen areas since the gentlemans ceasefire in December 2003,
have pointed to heightened insecurity for civilian populations, including a
raid on a Karen community during Karen New Year on January 10, 2005. Even as
the KNU remains open to a ceasefire despite these provocations, the regime still
refuses to commit to a formal one.
The authors congratulate the SPDCs "infrastructure development
program". SPDC-style "development" has meant improved military
access to commit forced labor, exploitation of natural resources and exploitation
of the civilian population.
8. They argue that there is little room for negotiating genuine
political reform given the "very obvious corporate and personal interests
they [the SPDC] have in maintaining power."
This undermines their entire argument - if you recognize that
there is no desire for political reform, why advocate rewarding the regime for
this? This is precisely why the EU should adopt comprehensive sanctions. When
the personal interests of the generals are directly at stake, the dialogue table
might finally get some meat on it.
9. The authors argue that sanctions should be revised in favor
of more realistic benchmarks for progress whereby the EU reciprocates with concrete,
positive gestures when steps are taken. The authors berate the international
community for "failing" to promote economic reform, but absolves the
SPDC of all responsibility.
The international community HAS promoted economic reform it
has always been very clear that sanctions and International Financial Institution
prohibitions were a direct response to poor economic management and governance.
Were those management policies to change, the international community would
change alongside. Benchmarks have been offered for example, the initiation of
a genuine tripartite dialogue. Japan, Malaysia and Singapore have all tried
to encourage economic reforms, but failed because they were not willing to back
these encouragements with firmness. The SPDC has had ample opportunity for reform,
but has only opted to take steps forward when faced with pressure.
10. They make a particular point of arguing that the SPDC is
not vulnerable to pressure.
This argument is based on the fact that the SPDC controls "every
lever of power" but ignores the fact that this control is also vulnerability.
Without the backing of public support, and without commitment to delivering
positive economic reforms, the SPDC is slowly imploding. Pressure is what has
made the SPDC react. Pressure, when backed by the power to implement tough economic
measures, from the ILO and FAT-F have elicited response. Firm, consistent pressure
is what is needed
11. They argue for an increase in aid.
The best aid for Burma is end to military rule. Burma has a
very limited absorption capacity for increased aid and is extremely difficult
to implement in a way that is transparent, accountable and independent. Extensive
research shows that aid is most effective under a democratic government and
has little sustainability under poor governance. The rationale behind delivering
increased aid is clearly to appease the generals. This unacceptable and inefficient.
12. The authors are dismissive of the ethnic nationalities
and local populations.
On the National Convention, they recognize that ethnic participants
will be unhappy with the process. Yet, they "view their compliance as assured,
as they have no other viable options," thereby suggesting that coercion
is acceptable and the ethnic nationalities are a problem to be overcome. Accepting
coercion is perverse and unacceptable: the ethnic nationalities make up a substantial
portion of the population; preventing their involvement in politics cannot bode
well for the future. Without genuine political franchise a cohesive and stable
governing structure cannot emerge.
It is curious why the authors have not directed their efforts
to convince the SPDC that they have no other "viable option" than
genuine democratic reform and reconciliation. Perhaps they have other priorities.
Source of the article: Mazzima
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