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Untitled Document
The 1979 Iranian revolution and the post reformist developments
on the 2nd of Khordad, two events in which the Khuzestani Arabs have participated
in, made it possible for the 3.5 million Arabs of Khuzestan to regain their
ethnic identity. These events also increased and strengthened their awareness
of the overall issues that are important to them.
They recognized, very correctly, that the way to regain their
plundered rights is to work hand in hand with the other nationalities and ethnic
groups for a free and democratic Iran. The council (shora) elections [of February
2003] proved that the Arab people of Khuzestan have nothing to do with those
who follow a violent and separatist discourse. They have gone even a step further,
by placing three women at the top of the list of elected candidates for the
city council of Ahwaz, the provincial capital of Khuzestan province. They proved
that, contrary to the anti-Arab propaganda, the Arabs of Khuzestan, more than
any other group, respect their wives, mothers and sisters.
In a previous article, I have written of the role of the ethnic
groups in the council elections. I predicted that in Tehran, the civic organizations
of the ethnic groups, due to organizational, political and financial weaknesses,
could not compete with either the conservatives or the Reformers’ national
parties. Nevertheless, the ethnic groups played their parts in places such as
Balouchestan, Kurdestan, Mehabad and Khuzestan.
The rise and the victory of the parties and the personalities
of our Arab compatriots in most Khuzestan cities and villages was significant.
This has been an important democratic development and should be viewed as a
good omen. Of course in a number of past elections, native Turks and Kurds,
with various political leanings, were elected in provinces such as Azerbaijan,
Ardabil, Zanjan and Kurdestan. In Khuzestan too, representatives of our Arab
compatriots were elected to parliaments and councils, at various points in time.
The difference between Khuzestan and the other provinces is that in the past
70-80 years, and after the removal of the Arabs from positions of power, a strong
non-Arab minority was created in its major cities.
What made the recent municipal council elections somewhat special,
was that, first, there was a relative degree of freedom. Second, the Arabs participated
with independent names and labels. And thirdly, not only did Arabs win the majority
of council seats in cities where they traditionally would have won, but also,
in cities in which Arab representatives were either in the minority or were
not represented at all.
The elections of February 2003 carried a lot of political,
social and historical lessons to be learned by both the Arab people of Khuzestan,
and other people of Iran. Particularly, political forces and parties have to
pay mind to these lessons, and we need to be aware and take note of the significance
of these loccurances.
Ahwaz Election:
We begin with Ahwaz, which is the main city of the Province
and also the 6th largest city of the country. More than 176,000 of the 500,000,
or 35% of the populations who were eligible to vote, did so in the Ahwaz city
council elections. In comparison to other major cities in Iran, and also in
comparison with international standards, this is an acceptable participation.
Now, the reasons why more Khuzestanis voted in this election.
Firstly, it is due to the fact that the elections were conducted in a relatively
free manner. Secondly, there was the presence of a tough and intense element
of ethnic competition during the election.
In one corner of this competition, there were the native Arab
personalities and their political parties. In the other corner were the candidates
of the other (non-Arab) ethnic minorities, who reside in the main cities of
the province. Certainly, there was political competition among candidates of
the same ethnic groups as well, but it was minor competition and not a deciding
factor.
The Lurs and Bakhtiari, two ethnic minorities that make up
about 10 to 15% of the population, entered into a coalition and managed to come
up with the second alternative.One of their candidates was Ziba Salepour who
received 24,000 of the votes, and was second only to Syeed Mehdi Al-Bu Shoka,
who was the first alternative. Al-Bu Shoka is a Khuzestani Arab Syeed (descendent
of the Prophet Mohammad).
Analysis of the election results in the city of Ahwaz shows
the following:
In the first city council elections, held in 1998, the 70%
strong Arab majority population of the city could only secure a minority position
in the city council. Also, in the national parliamentary elections of the year
2000, only one Arab representative was elected to the parliament. However, in
the last five previous parliamentary elections, the Arabs of Ahwaz often send
three and sometimes two representatives to the Islamic [National] Parliament;
but none of those representatives run as an independent Arab candidates. However,
eight of the nine Arab winners of the second Ahwaz councils ran on the ticket
of the Al-Wafagh [Harmony] Islamic Party, which basically is a nationalist Arab-Islamic
party that also considers itself to be a reformist party.
Syeed Naser Mousawi was the only elected councilman who was
not on the Al-Wafagh party ticket. In the first council election four years
ago, Mr. Mousawi received the most votes in Ahwaz. The majority who voted for
him were Arabs. In this election (second round ), Naser came in fourth.
The emergence of three women at the top of the elected list
was unprecedented for Iran; further, people were astonished that it came from
the Arabs. The fourth and fifth top vote-getters were two Syeeds, who enjoy
a respectable position among the common [Shi’a] people.
To show its democratic spirit, and despite the criticism of
some Arab groups, the Al-Wafagh party included Hamid Reza Salehi, a Bakhtiari,
on its list. Unfortunately, he did not get enough votes. In other words, the
Arab masses, contrary to the views of their intellectuals, did not choose this
non-Arab. There is some significance to this. Mr. Hamid Reza Salehi, who publishes
a local weekly newspaper, did the Arabs a service by including a section in
Arabic in his weekly paper. He was also on the list of the candidates of the
Lurs and Bakhtiari coalition.
It must be noted that the Al-Wafagh party, learning from its
previous experience, persuaded many independent candidates to step down so that
the bulk of the Arab vote would be more effective. In spite of Wafagh’s
recommendations, some Arab candidates ran as independents. However, their participation
in the election was not a serious challenge to the Al-Wafagh party. Al-Wafagh
entered into the political arena only four years ago, on the eve of the first
council’s elections, under the name of Lejnat Al-Wafagh [the Harmony Committee].
The significance of the victory of the Al-Wafagh party in particular,
and the Arab candidates in general in Ahwaz, is better understood when we learn
that this party, in comparison to other non-Arab candidates, had far fewer financial
resources and weaker non-Arab political backing.
For example M.R., a former commander of the Iranian Revolutionary
Guards, and presently a high positioned individual in the regime’s hierarchy,
who happens to be a Bakhtiari, made a three-day trip to Ahwaz during the election
campaigns. It has been said that he spoke in favor of the Lur and Bakhtiari
coalition at certain societies and in some circles. Of course, his favorite
candidates received the second, third, and fourth alternative positions. Also
major national leaders and personalities such as Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi, Ezzatallah
Negahban, Ezzatallah Sohabi, Dr. Payman, Tahereh Langeroudi, Varjavand, Alijani,
Parvin Bakhtiari, and their fellow travelers to Ahwaz, published a statement
in the national papers, supporting the candidacy of Mrs. Kahzadi, who is not
an Arab. Dr Payman went a step further when he attended the meeting of her supporters
in Ahwaz. But this lady did not garnish enough votes to even be an alternative.
These two examples give you a picture of the intensity of the
rivalries in the recent elections of the city council in Ahwaz.
Now, obviously every one is free to choose any candidate they
wish to support, but one would have expected such noted personalities to pay
at least the slightest bit of attention to their Arab countrymen; they could
have included at least one or two native Arabs in their approved list of candidates,
or attended one or two of their meetings. They could have done that, at least
for appearance’s sake, if nothing else. That way, they could have attracted
the confidence of their Arab countrymen.
This was expected from Dr. Payman more than anyone else. He
is apparently classified as being on the left side of the nationalist-religious
group, and in the sixth presidential elections, entered the campaign with the
slogan of equality for the ethnic groups. His qualification was rejected in
that summer of 1997, as we know. This latest move by Dr. Payman in Ahwaz shows
that either his slogan is losing its appeal, or that he basically does not consider
3.5 million Arabs as an ethnic group, or as Iranians.
At any rate, the election of the city councils showed the extent
of these gentlemen’s nationalism, as well as the extent of their religiosity.
It is possible that they think a nationalist must only come from their own ethnic
group; you know a “one of us” type mentality. And other Iranians,
Arab Iranians in particular, do not fall within this category. It seems that
the above named individuals and most of the Iranian political forces, have no
analysis or understanding of the Iranian ethnic groups, particularly no understanding
of the Arab Iranians. Their racial presumptions have always influenced their
political actions.
Recently in a newspaper interview, Taghi Rahmani, who belongs
to the honest forces of this current, said that the defeat of the reformers
in the council elections was due to not paying attention to three segments of
society: women, youth and ethnic groups.
I don’t know if the other nationalist-religious personalities
are aware of his views and agree with his analysis, or if maybe Mr. Rahmani
has reached that conclusion on his own just recently.
Mr. Ibrahim Yazdi also missed the point. His message was defeated
and his party was unsuccessful in Tehran, in Ahwaz, as well as in other Iranian
cities’ reelections. In an interview with E’temad newspaper, he
called the results of the election a prelude to the social and geographical
disintegration of Iran.
According to his point of view, the defeat of Nehzat Azadi
and the nationalist-religious forces in Ahwaz and other parts of Khuzestan,
meant a prelude to the disintegration [of Iran]. But of course, if his approved
candidates had won, it would have been a prelude for unity! Dr Yazdi insinuates
that the Arab-majority of the main cities of Khuzestan should have voted for
his approved minority-affiliated candidates so that the geographical disintegration
of Iran could be avoided.
The reformist groups, especially Jebhe Mosharekat, despite
their knowledge of the provincial leadership of the ethnic make-up of Ahwaz
and other cities of Khuzestan, did not exhibit fairness in the presentation
of their list of candidates for the Ahwaz city council. They included only two
Arabs in the nine-candidate list. These actions by the reformists drew Arabs
protests, and eventually led to the resignation of Ibrahim Ameri, the deputy
first secretary of the Jebhe Mosharekat Front in Khuzestan; a resignation that
ultimately will lead to the weakening of the Jebhe Mosharekat and the Reformists
in the Province.
This election, just like the previous ones, showed that the
reformist groups, and other internal opposition in Iran, do not have a fair
or calculated approach to the question of ethnic groups, particularly in regard
to the Arabs of Khuzestan. Their approach is an elitist one, and in a way, a
superiority-seeking approach.
It must be said that the majority of these forces and parties
do not have a plan or strategy or program to resolve the question of ethnic
nationalities. I hope that the victory of the national Arab parties and personalities
in Khuzestan, and to a certain extent [the Kurdish candidate’s victory]
in Kurdistan, has given cause for these friends to be more sensitive to the
warnings of Taghi Rahmani and to the views of the Khuzestani Arab political
activists and human rights advocates.
There is no doubt that the forces of the left - the democrats
and the reformists - are natural allies in the movement to obtain rights for
Iran's ethnic groups.
But for this alliance to materialize, these forces need to
start looking at the human rights of the ethnic groups from an equal footing
perspective.
The slogan of the Al-Wafagh in the second council election
was "justice, development and harmony", which is a meaningful slogan.
It means that the Arabs of Khuzestan are seeking justice, development, and harmony
with the other ethnic groups of the province.
The truth is that the real weight of the Arabs of Khuzestan
was reflected by the council election results. Therefore, the key positions
and appointments that are distributed unfairly right now should be redirected
in accordance with the above results (or at least 85% Arab and 15 % non-Arab).
Presently the reverse proportion is true.
The foundation of tribalism is still influential with the common
Arab folks.
In the past, each tribe used to nominate its candidate, which
resulted in the dilution of the Arab vote. Therefore, the Al-Wafagh party attempted
to counter this by nominating one candidate from each tribe.
For instance:
Najma Hamid from the Al-Hamid tribe
Belghis Beit Mash’al from Bani Torof tribe
Manijeh jasim Nejad, from Zergan tribe
Said Al-Kathir from Al-Kathir tribe
Ghamandar Ghazi from Al-Ghaz
Aidan Naseri from Nawaser tribe
Hadi Sawari from Sawari tribe.
Besides tribal affiliations, geographical considerations also
went into choosing the candidates.
Bani Torof and Sawari are mainly to the west of the Karoun;
Nawaser in Kut Abdallah and southern Ahwaz. Zergan and Al-Hamid are from the
northern and western parts of the Province.
It must be mentioned that the sheiks and traditional tribal
leaders did not have much of an active role in the election process. The candidates
themselves were not known for their tribal affinity. In fact, their association
with Al-Wafagh Party was a sign of their breakaway from traditional tribalism
and joining of civic institutions. But the clever blending of the two entities,
the tribe and the party, or tradition and modernism, by the Al-Wafagh party
leadership, was an innovative approach to blending democracy with the native
institutions of the Khuzestani Arabs.
Abadan Elections:
In Abadan, six Arabs and three non-Arabs entered the city council.
Arabs were a minority in the first city council, although Naji Mazra’a,
the head of the first city council, was an Arab. In Arvand-Kenar (Ghasba), which
is a part of Abadan, of the five elected council members, four (a woman among
them) are Arab and one is non-Arab. Al-Wafagh Party had no activity in Abadan;
tribalism and ethnic rivalries were the driving forces that dominated the elections.
The results of the election reflected the ethnic make-up of
the city (65% Arab and 35 % non-Arab), and also showed the role of the tribes
such as Ka’b – Mhaisin, Thawamer, the Sadat and some Arab sheiks.
There was a time when it was the leftist and workers’
parties that spoke the first word and had the upper hands in Abadan, but with
the war and its aftermath and consequences, the political and social scene of
the city changed. Of course in the past, tribal and ethnic issues also had their
roles in Abadan, but they were overshadowed by Labor’s issues.
Abadan too needs the activities of political parties and other
ethnic and civic associations similar to Al-Wafagh, so that civic rivalries
overtake tribal ones in the elections. The Ahwaz experience can be effective
in Abadan and other major cities of Khuzestan.
The issue of assigning governmental positions and posts in
Abadan is even worse than it is in Ahwaz, and needs to be adjusted according
to the results of the elections. Basically, proportionate assigning of key posts
(70% Arab and 30% non-Arab) is needed there. Presently, the Arabs have only
10 to 15% of such posts.
Elections in Khoramshahr and Other Cities:
In the first city council of the city of Khoramshahr (Mohammara),
whose population is 85% Arab, there were five Arab and two non-Arab members.
But in this election, all seven elected were Arabs. A mixture of ethnic, tribal
and religious tendencies had a role in the competition and ultimate victory
of these Arab candidates in Khoramshahr. There was a shift of power within the
religious establishment in the city. Until recently, a religious (Arabic) group
[tendency] was the main axis in the elections. But during the last election
of the councils, this tendency lost its effectiveness. One of the supporters
of the rival religious group overtook his rival by 9000 votes. There is no doubt
that Khoramshahr also has a need for the development of civic, cultural, political
and ethnic institutions so that they can also play their roles in competing
with the traditional institutions of tribalism and religious sects.
In each of the following four cities: Soosangerd (Khafajieh),
Bostan-Howaiezah and Rafi’, which are part of the Dasht Azadegan Shahrestan
(municipality), and in the townships of Bani Torof and Howaizah, everyone elected
was Arab. This is natural, since almost 100% of the population in this area
is Arab. The results were the same in Shadegan (Falaheih) for the same reason.
In this election cycle in Dasht-Azadegan and Shadegan, tribal
affiliation had the final word. However despite tribal influence, some of the
Arab youth, following the example of Ahwaz, founded their own social and civic
associations. But their giant rival, namely the tribal traditional institutions,
dwarfed these newborn modern and civic associations. Since there were no non-Arab
candidates in these cities, the competitive element in theses cities was mainly
tribal. Despite the recent rise in criticism of tribal foundations and growth
of anti-tribalism in favor of ethnic ideals, tribalism is still the stronger
force.
Despite the fact that 70% of the inhabitants of Susa (Shoosh
Daniel) are Arabs, both in the previous and present election cycles, the Arabs
were a minority among the chosen candidates. Basically, the city’s governmental
offices are staffed mainly by non-Arabs, and the Arab majority has no voice
in city matters. In addition, , the level of participation among Arabs in the
city council election is lower than in Khuzestan’s other Arab cities.
Of the seven elected for Shoosh city council, only two are Arabs. In the Alwan
(Abdulkhan) section of Shoosh township, all the elected council members are
Arabs and members of the Abdulkhan tribe.
Astonishingly, Arab ethnicity issues were of less importance
in Khuzestan’s Eastern cities. For example, in both Arab majority cities
of Omeedieh and Ramshir (Khalaf Abad), all five elected members of the councils
are Arabs; whereas, in the first round, the Arabs were a minority.
In the port city of Mahshahr (Ma’shoor), a 60% Arab city,
all five elected city council members are Arabs. In the cities of Hendijan and
Port of Imam Khomeini, of the seven elected city council members, one and three
are Arabs, respectively. The elections of Sarbandar, in which five Arabs were
elected, were voided for alleged election fraud, according to the committee
overseeing the results. However, the Arabs have denied these charges.
Finally, it must be said that various elections have an important
role in both politicizing the Arabs of Khuzestan, and also increasing their
civil and political awareness. The presence of democratic ethnic politics will
eventually weaken the independence-seeking tendencies, since people will see
that their children have the chance to enter parts of the establishment body,
an opportunity that rarely arose in the past 80 years.
Although the city councils have no role or power to restore
to the Arabs their ethnic rights, and only operate in the citizenry fields,
political participation and tribal rivalries and motives have played a role
in bringing people to the polling stations, as I mentioned earlier.
It must be said that most of those who were elected are the
children of this Revolution, former members of revolutionary and security foundations,
and veterans of the Iran-Iraq war.
The experiences of the past 50-60 years have proven that only
Arab civic foundations, whether political or cultural, are essential to cultural
enrichment, democratic growth, and political development among the Arabs of
Khuzestan.
In dealing with ethnic issues, the application of violence
and suppression will result in hate and distrust. We have witnessed this in
Khuzestan’s contemporary history. Violent confrontations with ethnic personalities,
such as the one with Mahmood Chehregani in the fifth cycle of the Tabriz election,
which eventually led to his emigration overseas, have only bore negative consequences..
The law should protect all of Iran’s children with disregard
to ethnicity, language and religion. Thus granting freedom to ethnic parties
and organizations was a correct and wise decision by Mr. Khatami’s government.
This was a point that I emphasized during my speech in the month of Mehr of
this year, before the Ministry of Interior (vizarat-e- keshvar). But this policy
must be expanded, consolidated, and supplemented by enforcing the two neglected
articles of the constitution, articles 15 and 19.
The momentous historical and absolute victory of the Arab personalities
and parties in the city council elections in Ahwaz and other major cities of
Khuzestan, demonstrate the weight and importance of the Arabs in the Khuzestan
province. Therefore, their votes and political and cultural potency cannot be
ignored. The End.
Written by Youssef Azizi
Translated by Abdul Reza Ameri
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