The writer, Sergei Markedonov is the head of the Department of Problems in Interethnic Relations at Moscow’s Institute of Political and Military Analysis. He contributed this comment to Russia Profile.

Moscow’s Control in Chechnya Is More Form Than Content

Last week the final phase of the process of the “korenizatsiya” (which could be translated as “indigenization”) of power and authority in Chechnya was completed with the elections to the republic’s parliament. In essence, Moscow has turned Chechnya over to the operational authority of local groups willing to maintain the outward appearance of loyalty to Moscow in exchange for significant political and economic privileges. But will this most recent electoral exercise serve as a step toward the peaceful resolution of the problems in the country’s “restless republic?”

In 2004, on the eve of the presidential elections in Chechnya, one political analyst, Konstantin Kazenin, in a pamphlet entitled “Around Chechnya: Russia’s Sturdy Rear Base in the Southern Caucasus?,” very concisely defined the results of the policy of “Chechenization” – “Chechnya remains one of the biggest problems facing the Russian state. It is doubtful that by simply pronouncing its success in the presidential elections, the Kremlin will have solved its difficulties there. This isn’t the first time that elections and referendums in Chechnya have delivered the desired result, but none of the previous instances have led to a radical improvement in the situation in the republic.”

After all, the Aug. 31, 2004 elections in Chechnya were followed almost immediately by the attack on Beslan. The tragedy served as a symbol of the lack of success in curing the “Chechen sickness” with the application of imitations of democratic procedures.

Not one of the models put forth by the federal authorities for solving the “Chechnya question” that has been implemented so far has brought tangible results. There have been a few:

1. The policy of blissful ignorance (1991-1994 and 1996-1999), the central idea of which was to simply ignore what was happening in Chechnya.
2. The policy of military coercion (1994-1996 and 1999-2002), with the main goal of neutralizing the sources of organized separatist opposition.
3. The “indigenization” of power (1995-1996 and 2002-2005), that is the transfer of power to key figures in the republic and local administrative groupings.

Not long before the latest anniversary of the separatist revolution in Chechnya, President Vladimir Putin signed into effect the law that called for last week’s elections. The whole essence of the plan was to increase the legitimacy of both the Russian federal government and the local administration.

There is little that could realistically threaten the groups in power in Chechnya today. Chechen separatism, in the sense of a military-political movement, is in crisis. It has evaporated into a sort of atomistic collection of bodies protecting their power in different territories of the republic from other centers of power looking to do just the same. The idea of a “Greater Ichkeria” no longer ignites Chechen separatists the way it did under former leaders Dzhokar Dudayev or Aslan Maskhadov. In addition, terrorism as a strategy for political struggle, was seriously devalued by the tragedy at Beslan and the continued violence promoted by Islamist terrorists. Today, even some of the staunchest defenders of the separatist cause in Chechnya see no political justification for supporting those organizing a great upheaval. Of course separatism and terrorism continue to be serious problems, but as a unified organized threat, radical Chechen separatism is presently unable to repeat past major attacks.

Following the policy of “Chechenization” that has been in place since 2002, the Kremlin has been prepared to grant concessions to politicians able to show that they were pro-Moscow, including President Alu Alkhanov and Deputy Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov. In 2003, Moscow forced through the new Chechen Constitution, not only breaking Russian federal laws, but also breaking with the rules of the game for relations between Moscow and the regions introduced by Putin in 2000. The legislative elections last week were just the latest step in bringing to power in Chechnya a regime that enjoys more freedom in exercising their power than any other regional government. While the “leveling of the playing field” in other republics has meant the removal of any cases where there were bi-cameral parliaments, in Chechnya, the proposal is to create exactly this kind of system (with the People’s Assembly as the lower house and the Republican Council as the upper). What’s more, the elections for the republican parliament were announced despite the fact that the status of three mountain regions of Chechnya (the Galanchovsky, Starayurtovsky and the Cheberloyevsky districts) were not legally fixed and the process of their legal formation was only completed once the campaign game was already well underway.

So the elections were the final act in the drama of the Chechenization of power. Now organs of power that are drawn from local political circles will develop. But will this help create a real, as opposed to simply formal, incorporation of Chechnya into the federal whole? The period of ignorance in federal politics brought into being an unrecognized state within Russia’s borders and led to the growth of ethno-national and religious aggression from that side. The policy of military coercion also showed its limitations as a general strategy for bringing Chechnya firmly inside the Russian Federation. The policy of the Chechenization of power in conditions where there is an absence of a strong civil society and real (and not pocket) political parties, as well as the under-the-table nature of agreements for the creation of political elites in the republic may also lead to the continuation of present political tendencies, meaning significant independence from control by Moscow.

Today in Chechnya, besides the existence of terrorist and insurgent separatist groups, there is also systemic separatism on the part of the political elites who believe that, while remaining part of Russia, Chechnya is outside of Russian control and jurisdiction. They prefer not to talk about the phenomenon of systemic separatism, but their political aspirations are clear enough. It is enough to look at the proposals for the demarcation of authority between Chechnya and the federal center that were prepared by “our people in Chechnya” and circulated in 2003 and 2005. These proposals called for the republic to receive unheard of authorities for a Russian region – including the right to set up republican representations abroad. The Kremlin continues to indicate its readiness to sign an agreement of this type to this day, despite the fact that it has categorically refused to sign such a deal with other regional governments. A prime example was an initiative that was quietly put forward by the former chairman of Chechnya’s State Council, Khusein Isayev, which called for the republic to be paid compensation for the fact that it was not able to take part in the privatization of state firms in the 1990s. We could also speak about the activities of the notorious “Vostok” (East) and “Zapad” (West) battalions in which former separatist fighters now serve on the pro-Moscow side without anything resembling oversight from the center and operate outside of the general Russian strategy.

Thus, the parliamentary elections don’t represent a political breakthrough. The elections were carried out under the control of those in power locally and with the support of “interested parties” in the Kremlin and the Presidential Administration and ultimately led to the creation of a kind of clone of the State Duma, although with a local ethno-political flavor. Unfortunately, the character of the elections for the Chechen legislature won’t ultimately help fight either of the main separatist tendencies that we have witnessed there. The group around Kadyrov has simply been reinforced by new clients in the parliament for the promotion of its own interests. The result is a model of power in the republic that is still not transparent. At the same time, the possibility that federal oversight in the region will be reduced further remains strong, particularly in the event of Moscow visits by members of the regional parliament looking to apply blackmail to gain further concessions. There is little reason to doubt that attempts of this type will be made.

So the parliament will now be responsible for laying the legislative groundwork for agreement on the delineation of authority between Moscow and Grozny. This, as mentioned above, will represent a departure from the practice in other regions where, since 2000, the practice of negotiation has been ruled out in practice. Whatever the result, Chechnya’s status within Russia will differ significantly from that of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, for example. The North Caucasus republic will possess much more in the way of “sovereign rights.”

As a result, while the Russian government is following a policy of increasing power at the federal level, the policy of “Chechenization” will include strengthening the influence of clan interests and informal mechanisms of power in the republic. At the same time, nothing is being done to establish any kind of normal dialogue with the narrow but promising layer of what, for lack of a better term, could be called “Europeanized Chechens,” living both within the republic and beyond its borders. What’s more, a realistic evaluation of the potential for working with such groups, or even a simple “inventory” of what is really out there has never been attempted. This group (and not former fighters like State Duma Deputy Ruslan Yamadayev) could serve as the conduit for a general solution in Chechnya, as opposed to the simple local privatization of power. When I speak about Moscow here, I mean not only the Kremlin, but also the democratic opposition to the present government. Unfortunately, our liberals are also unprepared for carrying out a serious investigation of the political market in Chechnya. It’s a lot easier to bring yesterday’s separatists under your banner, as was done by the Union of Right Forces when it included the former Ichkerian minister of defense, Magomed Khambiev, on its party list.

Thus, the parliamentary elections have served to paint a pretty picture for the Council of Europe, although it is unlikely that the council will believe any of it. Not understanding the real political dynamics at play in the region, the council will criticize Russia all the same. For their part, Russia’s representatives will counter with their criticism of the council’s inability to understand progress and democracy Chechen-style. Pro-Kremlin political analysts will go on emphasizing that the question of Russia’s territorial integrity has been closed, at the same time that it continues to be opened in Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkessia and, in particular, in Chechnya.

Source: Russia Profile