Indian and Chinese support for the military junta ruling Burma is increasing, and comes at the expense of the country’s oppressed ethnic minorities and human rights defenders.

Below is an article written by Ashok K. Mehta and published by the Daily Pioneer:

After Ms Aung San Suu Kyi celebrated her 62nd birthday earlier this month [June] under house arrest, ASEAN's secretary general Ong Keng Yong appealed to India (and China) to do a "a bit more" in securing her freedom. On January 13, China and Russia blocked a US-sponsored resolution in the UN that Myanmar is a threat to international peace and stability. India's revised pragmatic policy on Myanmar is driven by geopolitical interests to protect its periphery. But is it succeeding?

Historically, India and Myanmar have enjoyed close and cordial relations. Myanmar was hit by its first tragedy soon after independence. Gen Aung San, the founder of the Burmese Army, architect of independence and father of Ms Suu Kyi, was assassinated. The country enjoyed a brief stint of democracy under U Nu but in 1962 Gen Ne Win seized power, ushering in the longest and most durable military rule in the world. The parliamentary election of 1990 was overwhelmingly won by Ms Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy, but the military junta rejected the popular verdict. Its leader, Gen Than Shwe, who appears to have survived one more power struggle, is sticking to his seven-point roadmap of democracy, the centrepiece of which is a new Constitution institutionalising the military's role in national politics.

The Constitution-drafting process, the longest in history, began in 1993 with long periods of adjournment due to boycott by NLD. More than 1,000 delegates and representatives from 25 rebel groups who have signed a ceasefire but without decommissioning of weapons have participated in the national convention. The military claims that 75 per cent of the Constitution has been drafted and that the national convention will resume its work on July 17. The Karen National Union is the only large ethnic group that is still fighting the Burmese Army. […]
India was initially guided by ideological concerns: Human rights, denial of democracy and release of Ms Suu Kyi. While this was taking it nowhere, China was strengthening its relations with the regime. After a gut-wrenching debate, there was a dramatic reorientation of policy in 1994 to engage the military junta and induce internal change. India's strategic interests in Myanmar include securing its eastern flank against Indian insurgent groups in Myanmar, containing China's influence in Myanmar and in the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea, using Myanmar as a strategic bridge to the east and influencing internal change.

Myanmar is India's only ASEAN neighbour and shares 1,650 km of border with insurgency-ridden Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram. […].

Defence relations were initiated in 1995 after Gen Bipin Joshi became the first Army Chief to visit Myanmar. This was followed by high-level military diplomacy and exchange of visits, culminating last year in the most comprehensive schedule of visits to Myanmar led by President APJ Abdul Kalam and followed by all Service Chiefs and the Defence Secretary. India was a late arrival in Myanmar and, therefore, catching up with China will take time. The dysfunction between MoD and MEA and the lethargic decision-making process has not helped. India has removed all the stops for providing military hardware, training and software, but delivery is invariably slow and in doubt.

China's expanding circle of interest and influence started in 1988 when Myanmar had been internationally isolated. It stepped in with economic, military and development assistance. Nearly 80 per cent of all defence equipment is of Chinese origin, but Myanmar is getting wary of over-dependence on China. The Myanmarese are fiercely independent and would like to diversify sources of their weapons acquisition. India, Pakistan, North Korea, Israel, Poland and the Czech Republic have become weapon suppliers. Russia has sold MiG 29 fighters and is helping to build a nuclear power reactor.

Beijing's assistance in containing insurgency in Karen and Shan States had an element of self-interest as it did not want these insurgencies to spill into Yunan. Kachins and Shans inhabit both sides of the border with Yunan. Chinese economic influence is considerable, including supply of electricity to 30 km inside Myanmar and extends all the way to Mandalay. The population density in Chinese provinces bordering Myanmar is growing so rapidly that Chinese infiltration into Myanmar's sparsely inhabited areas has resulted in a takeover of business activity.

China's geostrategic goal is access from Yunan by river, rail and road through Myanmar towards the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea and also monitor India's vulnerable eastern flank. Myanmar values its relations with China and does not want to antagonise it. Yangon recognises the importance of its strategic location at the tri-junction of South, South-East and East Asia and a littoral state of the Indian Ocean.

India has not forgotten Myanmar's support for its candidature in the United Nations Security Council. India is building infrastructure in Myanmar through river, rail and road projects to improve connectivity. The focus is on the border areas where infrastructure is non-existent. The 1,800 MW Tamanthi hydroelectric project on Chinwin river signed in 1994 has yet to takeoff. Similarly, the Kaladin Indian Waterway project, linking Sittwe to Mizoram, finalised in 2002 has shown no progress. But this is not an impressive performance card.

By trying to isolate Myanmar from 1988 to 1993, India learnt its lesson to the detriment of its internal security in the North-East. India has to work with ASEAN and Asian powers like Japan, South Korea and China. While India is not competing with China, the best way to limit Chinese influence in Myanmar is to give the Myanmarese an alternative. India has shown the alternative but without the determination and drive of the Chinese. Delhi requires a second internal debate to fix priorities and programmes that will work to the mutual interest of the two countries.